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JURISDICTION
This
Three,

court has
Article

jurisdiction to

Eight

of the

Utah

hear this

matter pursuant

Constitution and

Utah

to Section

Code Annotated

78-2-2(3)(a).
The Claimant,

William R. Comer, applied for and was denied unemployment

compensation

following

Petitioner,

The United

Administrative

the termination

of his

States Air Force,

Law Judge who reversed

His

employment by

the employer

claim was then

heard by an

the Department's prior determination.

The employer appealed to the Board of Review who sustained the Administrative
Law Judge.

The employer filed a petition for review.

The ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and the decision of the Board
of

Review have been reproduced

as attachments A and

B respectively and are

included in the back of this brief.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was

the decision of the

Board of Review contrary

to the facts in

the record?
2.

Were

the regulations

which were

applied reasonable

and did they

subserve the statute they were created to enforce?
DETERMINATIVE LAW
This

case turns on the following

law,

included in the back of this brief.
Attachment C: Executive Order 12584
Attachment D: Utah Code Annotated 35-4-5
Attachment E: Industrial Commission Rules

1

reproduced as attachments,

and

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr.

William R.

terminated

on

Comer's employment with the United States Air Force was

September

5,

1988,

see

record

at

40. He

applied for

unemployment insurance benefits which were denied in a decision dated October
3rd,

1988,

see record at 38. A hearing

31st and November 1st,
reversed
dated

was held on his appeal on October

1988, see record at 35. The administrative law judge

the prior determination and awarded Mr.

November 2,

Comer benefits in an order

1988. That decision was upheld by the Board of Review in

its decision dated January 17, 1989.
Mr.
Because

Comer was a boiler mechanic,
of the

area in

which he

wage grade 10 see record at 53,

was employed

he was

required to

79.

have a

security clearance, see record at 55.
Mr.

Comer was terminated after the Air

Force was notified that he had

sold cocaine to an undercover agent and he was arrested, while on duty on Air
Force property, after the conclusion of an undercover into allegations of his
involvement in drug sales and use on base, see record at 43, 57, 80.
Force had previously been made aware,
the
Force

Stuffelbeam,
Mr.

see

record

at

43. The

an Air Force employee,

on events which took place on Air
investigation

involved

a

drugs in Mr.

63,

73. Mr.

Comer's possession while at work,

job,

to

see

Stufflebeam further stated that he had observed

authorities were advised by Mr.
on the

Mr.

who advised Air Force authorities that

Comer had encouraged him "to participate in some illegal drug use",

record at 44,

while

on August 16, 1988, that Mr. Comer was

subject of a drug investigation based
property,

The Air

see record at 73. Air Force

Stuffelbeam that Mr.

use cocaine,

2

see

record at

Comer had invited him,
64. Another Air Force
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The Board of Review's decision is not supported by the record.
By his actions in selling cocaine Mr. Comer lost required certification.
ARGUMENT
I
TWO STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLY
A
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
As

with

reviews

of

other administrative

agencies

this

court gives

deference

to facts determined by the agency at the hearing level if they are

supported

by the evidence.

is given.

In Hurst v.

(Utah,

Where they are

Board of Review of the Ind.

Com'n,

723 P2d 416, 419

1986) the Utah Supreme Court described this deference.

of

fact,

by

this Court unless they are without

thus

not supported no such difference

"On questions

the Commission's findings are conclusive and not subject to review

clearly arbitrary

substantial support in the record and

and capricious."

Several "facts"

contained in the

decision of the Board of Review are without such support.
At
occurred
involve
that Mr,
at
Mr.

page 123 of
away from

the record the
the Air

board concludes that

Force base

other Air Force employees."

during off-duty

"The incident had
hours and

The record of the hearing in fact shows

Comer was arrested on Air Force property during duty hours,

page 78.

It is

Comer was

did not

also uncontroverted that

commenced because of

record

the investigation initiated on

evidence of on

base drug involvement,

record at 78. The record also shows that one of the people to whom Mr. Comer
sold drugs was a federal co-worker, record at 80. The record shows no denial
by

Mr.

Comer of his

admissions in the OSI report
4

that he used cocaine and
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i

r

J » ^

;

'icdte
4

"^an^

; > --

,ije^ i o'-ir

•- -

'--d because Lue

1

.•^iigat-

- «:.

.hstantiaK

.; i ^ S

' *

conduct

l

< -• n n a l i o n -> '-ad "- ^ w e c

a p p I 0 <X C

.i-j:: ^

*-*

•

M onpoij

•

•• v

<. r

imuacts

culoabil

rommpnc^H an

record at 78.

JIIM

-

I O W cJi-J

the boards subsequent

:.
• '•

becausp : ( w a*-*„

- jve bin

w^.u;tvlu,

.>e -J • r e g a r d " J

• — Hr^ u;—~J-

^ppus t ... w..e record and ihus a r o i i r a r y

am i : i :api ic ioi is
B
LEGAL CONCl I I S I O N S R E C E I V E NO D E F E R E N C E
1 111. I II1111"
Review

are provided

I i 1 1 1 i t :! i
rule

ti 'J'"

il 111 ni III il : I: il : i i i a i i : l p i o c e • :l i 11 e 1 ' c i i i m I il i i g s m a d e
for

by U.C •

I : : coi \> :: 11 is ill01 is 0 1 Il a/i

35-4-10.

Il I 1 i s matte?

Hie s t a t u t e

b 3 11 1 e B 0 a 1 d 0 f
provides that

is tl ins subject to the general

of the law of appea i and erroi • to the effect that tl 1 ii. 5; coi n t n e e d g i v e

I"' 11 i 1 1 ( U t a h ,

1 9 8 5 ) Il Il 1 Il jg, , Il c o n c l u s i o n s r e a c h e d t • >;

5

1:1 e Board of

Review

are in

error and do

not follow

from the evidence

presented at the

hearing.
The

Board held,

at pages 123 and 124 of the record,

1.

There was no

showing that the claimants actions had a connection with the employees duties
or the employer's business interests, and 2. Mr. Comer's termination was not
for

just

hearing.

cause.
The

The employer

employer did

was not

represented by

articulate numerous

an attorney

reasons,

all

adequate evidence which would require the denial of benefits.
of

Review chose

should

not

to focus its

bind the

decision on

employer to

the nexus and

those legal

at the

supported by
That the Board

just cause issues

theories where

evidence was

presented which would require denial of benefits on other theories.
The
the

legal conclusions listed above are in error when viewed in light of

evidence presented at the

hearing and should result

in reversal of the

board's decision.
II
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE
Rule

R475-5bl-2

defines

just

cause

as

having

three

elements

a.

culpability, b. knowledge, and c. control.
A. CULPABILITY
Rule
"The

wrongness

particular
analyzing
the

R475-5bl-2(l)(a)
of the

employment

establishes general

conduct must

be

and

affects

how

it

criteria

considered in
the

for culpability.

the context

employer's

of the

rights."

In

culpability we must remember who the parties are. The employer is

United States Government,

the employee is

required a security clearance.

6

a mechanic whose employment

The
than

rights of the employer,

those of

any other

during the month Mr.
Leadership
States

pertaining

to drug offenses,

conceivable employer.

This

is the

are broader
employer who,

Comer's appeal was heard, passed the National Narcotics

Act of 1988,

Public Law 100-690,

Government has waged

war on drugs on

filling 364 pages.

many different fronts.

the major problem areas addressed has been drugs in the military.
shows

that Mr.

employing
coupled

Comer was admonished

by the commander

the

United

States

Government's

major

One of

The record

of the organization

him that drug involvement would-not be,tolerated.
with

The United

Those warnings,

offensive

on

drugs

constitute major employer rights.
Attached
issued

hereto as

Attachment C

is a

copy of

Executive Order 12584,

by the President of the United States on September 15,

"Drug

Free

policy

Federal

Workplace.

That Executive

for all federal employees,

establishes

Mr.

Order

1986 entitled

establishes national

Comer included.

The Executive Order

national policy by ordering certain actions by federal employees

and federal employers.
In

the findings section of the Executive Order the President finds that

illegal
placed

drugs,

on or off duty,

in federal

involved,

3.

employees,

impairs the

1.
2.

are inconsistent with the public trust
lessen effectiveness

efficiency of government

inconsistent with access to sensitive information.
have

of those employees

employers,

and 4.

is

Mr. Comer was required to

a security clearance and was arguably in the category of people defined

by the Executive Order to be in sensitive positions.

7

The Executive Order directs federal employers,
initiate
to

action to remove offending employees.

proceed

required.
rights

on the
The

basis of

offending

any appropriate

employees

Mr. Comer's included, to

The employers are authorized
evidence,

retained their

under the Civil Service Reform

Act.

conviction

industrial

is not

due process

The Air Force's actions against

Mr. Comer were required by and comported with Executive Order 12584.
The

Executive

employees.
by

They

Order

specific

sale of those

to the use of drugs,

anyone

issues

are required to refrain from

logical extension the

only

also

directions

federal

the use of illegal drugs (and

drugs).

The Executive Order refers

not to the consumption of drugs.

who sells drugs has used them even

to

It follows that

if they are in that rare category

of drug dealers who have not consumed them.
It
arise

takes little imagination
if this

to envision the

federal employer failed

public outcry which would

to terminate the

employment of drug

peddlers on it's payroll.
This
Employment
was

case should be compared
Sec

to that of Clearfield

663 P2d 440 (Utah 1983).

denied benefits after having been

charged with sodomy.

special status of the

employer held the employee

than

might be

other employees.

acquitted

or the sodomy

charge).

(The

acts

private employer has
which would

the right to

bring dishonor on

The court ruled

policeman was ultimately
of an employee of

at 443,

". . . a public

expect his employees

to refrain from

the business name

The court also cited another public

or the institution."

employment case denying benefits ".
8

of

to a higher standard

In citing another case

the federal government the Utah Supreme Court said,
or

Dept.

There an off duty police officer

that

required of

City v.

..

the

claimant had deliberately

the

affirmative duty to administer

such

a

responsibility

disregarded a statute

upon the

and enforce."
United

which his employer had

Public Law 100-690 places

States Department

of

Defense and

accordingly upon the Air Force.
The
to

ruling of the Board of Review

employ Mr.

used

them

would require the Air Force to continue

Comer and those of his ilk until it could establish that they

while working

on supersonic

jet aircraft,

or be

punished for

terminating them.
B. KNOWLEDGE
Rule

R475-5bl-2(l)(b)

discusses

the knowledge element

of just cause.

The uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Comer, and his coworkers were told by
their

employer that no drug involvement

would be tolerated.

Mr.

Comer had

knowledge that he would be subject to discipline for selling drugs.
C. CONTROL
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(c)
issue

is whether

discusses the control element of just cause.

or not the

which led to his termination.

employee had

the ability to

No one but Mr.

The

prevent the acts

Comer controlled of whether or

not he sold cocaine.
All
were

met in Mr.

entitle
cause

of the

him
be

particular

elements for a just cause discharge
Comer's termination.

to unemployment

examined in

light

His just

benefits.
of the

The

9

cause termination does not

regulation requires

particular

employment is more sensitive to

under Rule R475-5bl-2

that just

employment involved.

This

drug involvement than almost any

conceivable.

Any

showing

of culpability

is

sufficient to

meet

the just

cause.
Ill
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR WILLFUL AND
WANTON ACTS ADVERSE TO HIS EMPLOYER
The
within
acts

firmly believes

the parameters of
constituting

reaches
must

Appellant

that the

actions

both the statute and

a crime

with an

the conclusion that Mr.

claimant fit

the regulation pertaining to

employment

nexus shown.

Comer's acts do not

nonetheless deny benefits because the

of the

If

the court

constitute a crime it

Claimant's acts were willful and

wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest,

as that term is used

at U.C.A. 35-4-5(b)(l).
Ill
THE RULE UNDER WHICH THE CLAIMANT WAS GRANTED
BENEFITS DOES NOT REASONABLY RELATE TO THE PURPOSE
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT
A
THE RULE DOESN'T SUPPORT THE ACT
While
rules
not

this

court must

give deference

to the

and there interpretation that deference does
reasonable.

In West Jordan v.

Industrial Commission's
not apply if the rule is

Department of Employment S e c ,

411, 412 (Utah, 1982) the Utah Supreme Court said " . . .
still

subject

to

judicial

review

and will

be

656 P.2d

agency decisions are

reversed

where

they are

inconsistent with the governing legislation or the decision so this Court."
The stated purpose of the Employment Security Act is to benefit the ". .
health,

morals,

and welfare of the people of this state", U.C.A. 35-4-2.

10

The description of that purpose was amplified by the Industrial Commission in
rule

R475-2-l(l)

lighten
The

"One of the purposes of the Employment Security Act is the

the burdens of persons unemployed

"through no fault of his own"

through no fault of their own..."

language of the rule was apparently taken

directly from the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Olof Nelson Const.
Industrial Commission,
no

121 Utah 525, 243 P.2d 951, 958 (1952).

fault of his own" language in the

state the purpose of the act.
Comer

claimant was

drugs.
his

v.

The "through

both the rule and the Olof Nelson case

The clear, uncontroverted evidence is that Mr.

in complete

control of

his actions

and chose

to sell

His discharge and resulting unemployment was not "through no fault of

own".

process
flout

Co.

He had a secure job with

rights existing

any where

the most complete set of industrial due
in the

world yet

chose to deliberately

his employers clearly stated policy against any drug involvement.

health,

morals and welfare of the people

The

of this state are not uplifted in

any fashion by requiring the federal government to employ drug dealers.
The

application of the departments rules

in a fashion which allows Mr.

Comer to receive benefits is contrary to the stated intent of the statute and
the Supreme Court's prior decisions interpreting it.
B
THE RULES ARE RANDOMLY APPLIED
Attached

hereto

as Attachment

F

is a

copy

of the

Board

decision in Johnson v. Industrial Commission, Case number 880703-CA.
case
to

the Board of Review upheld

of Review
In that

the Administrative Law Judge's decision not

allow benefits where an employee

violated his employers drug and alcohol

policy through off base use.

11

The

employer's drug and alcohol policy could

Johnson

than in

Force's

policy into account.

claimant's
refused

this case yet

violation of

the Board of

Review failed to

take The Air

In Johnson the Board of Review relied upon the

state drug

laws,

to give an identical argument

claimant's

not be any more strict in

including

U.C.A.

any weight here.

specific admission to the sale of

58-37-8,

but

This is despite the

cocaine at the time he applied

for benefits, see record at 2.
The fact that Mr.
through

Comer was discovered to have been involved with drugs

and undercover buy from

him does not lessen

legislative finding,

stated at U.C.A.

is

The

a laudable goal.

attempts

34-38-1,

the application of the

that a drug free work force

Board of Review's sustaining

to achieve this goal in Johnson only

the employer in it's

makes its failure to do so in

this case that much more mystifying.
While the appellant is not arguing that the Johnson case is precedent in
this

case the

circumstances
reasonable

Board of Review's
can

only

and rationally

lead

to

application of different
the conclusion

applied as required

that

rules to similar

the

rules

by the Supreme

are not

Court in the

West Jordan case.
IV
THE RULE UNDER WHICH THE CLAIMANT WAS GRANTED
BENEFITS DOES NOT REASONABLY RELATE TO THE PURPOSE
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT REGULATIONS
Industrial Commission Rule R475-2-l(l)

was cited in the next proceeding

section as stating the legislative intent of the Act.
rule

also states

the intent

of the

12

rest of

As the preamble,

that

the unemployment compensation

regulations.
"through
next

That

intent

is

to

no fault of their own".

preceding section

provide

relief

for

persons

unemployed

For the reasons stated in section A of the

of this brief

Mr.

Comer's actions

should deny him

benefits because his loss of employment was through his own fault.
VI
THE FACTS IN THE RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD'S RESULT
The
record.

Board of
The

Review was

required to

Administrative Law Judge

uncontroverted

evidence

which

rely upon

and the Board

require denial

of

the facts

within the

of Review both ignored
benefits.

That evidence

includes
(a) The
3,

claimant's admission of distribution of cocaine,

record at 2,

and 80 showing dishonesty, actions constituting a crime, and violation of

his employer's stated policy on drugs.
(b) The
Systems

claimant's

industrial

Protection Board,

due process

see record at 42,

rights

before

the Merit

showing that his discharge was

for just cause,
(c) The

individual to whom he sold cocaine was a co-worker,

record at

80 showing work involvement,
(d) The
policy,

see

claimant's understanding
record

at 52,

87

of the

showing

employer's explicit

culpability and

just

no drug
cause for

dismissal.
(e)

The Air Force has a strong anti-drug policy,

see record at 12, 50,

68, 74, and 113, showing that off base drug sales are work related.
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VII
THE CLAIMANT WAS DISCHARGED FOR DISHONESTY
CONSTITUTING A CRIME
U.C.A.
for
"A

35-4-5(b)(2)

dishonesty constituting
crime is a

a crime.

punishable act in

State or the United States",
a.

denies the claimant benefits if he was discharged
Commission

Rule R475-5b2 elaborates.

violation of law:

R475-5b2(l).

an offense against the

R475-5b2(3) lists the elements as

in connection with work, b. dishonesty, and c. admitted or established by

a conviction in a court of law.
As
in

shown above in the discussion on "Just Cause" the claimant's actions

selling cocaine were in connection with work.

that

his employer is charged by

This follows from the fact

the United States Congress with eradicating

drug abuse, the fact that he, and his fellow employees, had been advised that
any drug involvement would result in termination.
Neither
appropriate
Law
as

the Act nor its regulations define dishonesty.
to examine other common

legal definitions of the term.

Dictionary does not define honest or honesty.
"Disposition

integrity."

The

to lie,
first

cheat
synonym

or defraud;
for

honest

Thesaurus, College Edition, is "law abiding".
chargeable
crime
the

as a

second degree felony

chargeable under 21 U.S.C.
United States

of America,

It is therefore

the

It does define dishonesty

untrustworthiness;
listed

by

The

Random

House

58-37-8.

It

is also a

latter statute being enacted by

employer of

Mr.

Butler.

logical definitions of dishonesty include the claimant's actions.
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lack of

The act of selling cocaine is

under U.C.A.

841. The

Black's

The natural,

The

only

issue

remaining

is whether

established by a conviction in a court of law.

his

actions

were

admitted or

The record shows Mr.

Comer's

acknowledgment of his crime as well as the fact that he had plead guilty to a
drug

related offense.

The board acknowledged that his actions constituted a

crime, record at 124.
The

actions of Mr.

Comer meet the

statutory definition of dishonesty

constituting a crime and should result in denial of benefits.
VIII
THE CLAIMANT LOST HIS LICENSE
Rule 475-5b-8(5)

includes among appropriate reasons for discharge "When

an employee loses a license which he knows is required for the performance of
the job, and the individual had control over the circumstances which resulted
in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying."
As

a mechanic Mr.

clearance.
Clearance
record
Force

The

Comer was required to have a current restricted area

uncontroverted

Office suspends

evidence

the security

is

that

the

clearances of

Air

Force Security

drug offenders,

see

at 66. The Security Clearance Office is not under the control of Air
Officials at Hill Air Force

Base and that office's independent action

constitutes a lose of license under the rule.
The respondent may argue that suspending Mr.
is

an act

over which the

independent
is

ground for termination.

that the State

under

employer had

of Utah will

Comer's security clearance

control and may

The logical

of the state.
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used as an

extension of that argument

never be justified

this regulation because the Department

not be

in terminating a driver

of Motor Vehicles is an agency

CONCLUSION
The

Board of

Review in

this action

completely ignored

relevant law,

facts in the record, and commonly used definitions of words in order to award
Mr.

Comer unemployment benefits.

sale

constituted

Mr.

adequate grounds

Comer admitted selling cocaine.

to allow

any

employer to

That

terminate an

employee for cause and to deny benefits.
In
even

this case other special facts

more inappropriate.

process
have

rights.

First,

Mr.

make the Board of Review's decision
Comer

had substantial industrial due

Had he truly felt he was being unjustly terminated he could

followed that process,

while remaining on

Comer,

and his

because

of the special status of their employer.

this

fellow federal

by his commander.

employees,

are

the payroll.
held to
Mr.

Second,

Mr.

a higher standard

Comer was informed of

All federal employees are presumed to have notice of

this by virtue of Executive Order 12584.
Mr.
majority
of

Comer's termination,

was appropriate under the

of operative provisions of the Departments Regulations.

benefits

benefits

without benefits,

is clearly

is not.

supported

by the

evidence

while the

The denial
granting of

The decision of the Board of Review should be reversed and

benefits denied.
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Dated this 30th day of May, 1989

DEE V. BENSON
United States Attorney
by

)BERT H.WILDE
Special Assistant
United^Startes Attorney

CLARE A. J(j
Special Assistant
United States Attorney
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Industrial Commission,

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
Appeals Tribunal
Decision of Administrative Law Judge

William R. Comer
4364 Palmer Road
Erda, Utah
84074
APPEAL FILED: October 12, 1988
APPEARANCES:

Claimant/Employer
David Knowlton, Esq.

S.S.A.

No.

Case No.
DATE OF HEARING:

528-08-6111
88-A-04707
October 31, 1988
November 1, 1988

PLACE OF HEARING: Telephone

The Department's decision dated October 3, 1988, denied unemployment insurance
benefits effective September 4, 1988, holding the claimant was discharged from
his employment for just cause. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment
Security Act is quoted on the attached sheet.
Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section
35-4-6(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The claimant worked as a boiler plant equipment mechanic for Hill Air Force
Base from December 1, 1980 to August 16, 1988. He was terminated from his
employment because of off-duty conduct which resulted in him being placed under
arrest.
The claimant worked for the employer at the Utah Test and Training Range. The
position required a security clearance. The employer had provided him with a
limited access badge to the controlled area pending adjudication of his
security clearance.
Sometime in February 1988, one of the claimant's co-workers approached the
personnel department to discuss his employment status. He represented that he
was a recovering drug user and finding it difficult to function in his current
work assignment.
He suggested that the claimant had invited him to use a
controlled substance on the job. As a result of the conversation, the
co-worker was transferred to a position at Hill Air Force Base. The matter was
referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The latter part of
February, 1988, the employer took away the claimant's limited access badge. He
was required at that point to be escorted into controlled areas. The
claimant's manager attempted to have him transferred to a new work station
which would not require a security clearance.

528-08-6111
88-A-04707
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On July 26, 1988, a criminal complaint was issued against the claimant for
unlawful
distribution, offering, agreeing,
consenting or arranging
to
distribute a controlled substance. The complaint alleged that a party had
purchased cocaine from the claimant on April 8, 1988. The claimant was
arrested while at work on August 16, 1988, and charged with unlawful
distribution of a controlled substance. He served one day in jail and was then
released on bail. He reported back to work the following day. He was barred
from re-entering the military installation pending an investigation of the
incident.
A Notice of Proposed Removal Letter was presented to the claimant on August 21,
1988.
He was advised the action was proposed for the offense of off-duty
misconduct of such a major import that the employee was unable to fulfill his
job responsibilities. The letter suggested the claimant had sold two grams of
cocaine, a controlled substance, to a Utah State Narcotics Bureau special agent
on April 8, 1988. A Report of Investigation was distributed to the employer on
August 30, 1988, detailing the events that led to the claimant's arrest on
August 16, 1988. A decision was issued by the employer on September 1, 1988,
removing the claimant from his civil service position.
The claimant had received no previous warnings concerning his job performance.
He was considered by the employer to be a satisfactory employee. The claimant
appeared in court on September 19, 1988, and entered a guilty plea' to a
third-degree felony charge of attempting to unlawfully distribute a controlled
substance. He is scheduled to be sentenced the first part of November, 1988.
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW:
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provide in
pertinent part:
A.
.
Unemployment insurance benefits will be denied if
the employer had just cause for discharging the employee.
However, not every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny
benefits.
In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant
to Section 35-4-5(b)(l), there must be some fault on the part
of the employee involved.
B.

JUST CAUSE

1.
The basic factors which establish just cause
essential for a determination of ineligibility are:
a.

and

are

Culpability

This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the
offense
as
it affects
continuance of
the
employment
relationship.
The discharge must have been necessary to avoid
actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests.

528-08-6111
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B.l.b Knowledge
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the
employer expected.
It is not necessary that the claimant
intended to cause harm to the employer, but he should
reasonably have been able to anticipate the effect his conduct
would have.
B.l.c Control
The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of the
claimant to control or prevent.
G.

IN CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT

Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses which take
place on the employer's premises or during business hours. It
is only necessary that the conduct have such "connection" to
the employee's duties and to the employer's business that it is
a subject of legitimate and significant concern to the
employer. All employers, both public and private,
have the
right to expect employees to refrain from acts which are
detrimental to the business or would bring dishonor on the
business name or the institution. Legitimate interests of
employers include, but are not limited to: Goodwill of
customer, reputation of the business, efficiency, business
costs, morale of employees, discipline, honesty, trust and
loyalty.
The claimant, at the time of separation, was a suspect in a case involving the
distribution of a controlled substance. Although he had been implicated in the
sale, he had entered no plea on the charge nor had he provided any statements
to the employer representing guilt on his part. The employer relied solely on
the investigation report which alleged the claimant had been involved in the
sale of a controlled substance. It is of special note that the offense
occurred while the claimant was off duty. There was no special notoriety given
to the incident other than the claimant being arrested while at work on August
16, 1988. The matter was not publicized and co-workers who may have observed
the arrest could only speculate as to the cause of that action. The claimant
emphatically denies using drugs on the job or participating in any activities
which would have resulted in co-workers purchasing or using illegal substances.
The employer's position that the discharge was prompted by the claimant's
inability to obtain a security clearance is unpersuasive. The claimant had
worked for the employer for over seven years without any special clearance, and
the evidence does not sustain that this hampered his job performance in any
way. The only supportable conclusion to be adduced from the evidence presented
by the parties is that the claimant was discharged for his off-duty conduct
which resulted in his being arrested on August 11, 1988. The employer failed
to show the conduct had any direct connection to the employee's duties, or the
employer's legitimate business interest. While the employer may have had the
right to fire the claimant because of his off-duty activities, there is
insufficient evidence to show his actions rise to the level of culpability so
as to constitute disqualifying~conduct under the terms of the statute.
Under
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these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge concludes the claimant
not discharged from his employment for just cause.

was

DECISION:
The Department's decision denying to pay the claimant unemployment insurance
benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah
Employment Security Act is reversed. The claimant is allowed unemployment
insurance benefits effective September 4, 1988, provided he is otherwise
eligible.

^Z-4c=^

Norman Barnes
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
This decision will become final unless, within ten days from November 2, 1988,
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P.O. Box 11600, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal is made.
mj
Attachment
cc: Air Force Hill Air Force Base
2849 ABG/DPCEB
Civilian Personnel, D. Mabey
Hill AFB, Utah
84056
David Knowlton, Esq.

BOARD OF REVIEW
The I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
WILLIAM R. COMER
S.S.A. No. 528-08-6111

:
Case No.

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

TRC/NB/AH/cdm

:

DECISION

:

Case No.

88-A-4707

88-BR-435

:

The employer, U. S. Air Force-Hill A i r Force Base, appeals the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, in the above-entitled matter
which held that WiTliam R. Comer had been discharged from his employment
f o r reasons that are not d i s q u a l i f y i n g under §35-4-5(5)(1) of the Utah
Employment Security Act. The ALJ's decision therefore allowed payment of
unemployment benefits t o the claimant e f f e c t i v e September 4 , .1988 and
continuing, provided he is otherwise e l i g i b l e .
After careful consideration of the record i n t h i s matter, the
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be
a correct a p p l i c a t i o n of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security
Act, supported by competent evidence, and therefore affirms the decision.
Comer was f i r e d by the A i r Force a f t e r he was arrested by c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s and charged with d i s t r i b u t i o n of i l l e g a l drugs. Comer
l a t e r pled g u i l t y to a reduced charge of attempted d i s t r i b u t i o n of
i l l e g a l drugs. The incident had occurred away from the A i r Force base
during o f f - d u t y hours and did not involve other A i r Force employees.
Seven months p r i o r to Comer's a r r e s t , a
Base Commander t h a t Comer had offered him i l l e g a l
Comer was not t o l d of the co-worker's allegations
l i n a r y action taken against him. At the hearing
employer did not c a l l the co-worker as a witness;
oath t h a t the co-worker's allegations were f a l s e .

co-worker advised the
drugs while on duty.
nor was any d i s c i p before the ALJ, the
Comer t e s t i f i e d under

In permitting payment of benefits, the Board does not minimize
Comer's reprehensible conduct. However, benefits cannot be denied under
§5(b) (1) unless i t i s shown that his misconduct was " i n connection with
employment" and that such misconduct constituted " j u s t cause" for his
discharge.
The Board recognizes that even off-duty conduct may be " i n connection with employment" under some circumstances. As stated i n Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-7:
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D i s q u a l i f y i n g conduct is not l i m i t e d to offenses
which take place on the employer's premises or
during business hours. I t is only necessary that
the conduct have such "connection 11 to the employee's
duties and t o the employer's business that i t is a
subject of l e g i t i m a t e and s i g n i f i c a n t concern to the
employer.
In t h i s case, the employer has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h any such connection
between Comer's criminal conduct and his work duties or the employer's
business. The employer might have demonstrated such a connection by proving
Comer offered i l l e g a l drugs t o other employees at work, as alleged by a
co-worker. However, the co-worker's allegations were submitted in the form
of a hearsay statement by another witness; the employer f a i l e d to obtain the
d i r e c t testimony of the co-worker himself. For his p a r t , Comer categorically
denied, under o a t h , the co-worker's a l l e g a t i o n s .
Given t h i s state of the
record, no competent evidence exists to support a f i n d i n g of employmentrelated drug a c t i v i t y . The Board must therefore conclude that Comer's misconduct was not i n connection with employment.
Even i f the Board were to f i n d t h a t Comer's misconduct was connected t o his employment, the employer must also establish that Comer's
discharge was f o r j u s t cause as that term i s used i n § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . Just cause is
established i f each of the elements of c u l p a b i l i t y , knowledge and control
e x i s t . I t i s the element of c u l p a b i l i t y which is absent in t h i s case.
C u l p a b i l i t y is defined as the seriousness of the worker's conduct
as i t a f f e c t s continuance of the employment r e l a t i o n s h i p . The discharge must
have been necessary to avoid actual or p o t e n t i a l harm t o the employer's
rightful interests.
(See Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-2.1.a) While
the employer might conceivably be able to show Comer's conduct posed some
p o t e n t i a l f o r harm t o i t s l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s , mere speculation and conclusionary statements on the part of the employer are i n s u f f i c i e n t to establish
c u l p a b i l i t y . The Board p a r t i c u l a r l y notes the employer permitted Comer to
continue his employment even a f t e r serious charges of drug related a c t i v i t y
had been leveled against him. The employer's f a i l u r e to act indicates i t
did not consider Comer's p r i o r conduct to be culpable. The Board must therefore conclude Comer was not discharged f o r j u s t cause w i t h i n the meaning of
§ 5 ( b ) ( l ) of the A c t .
This decision becomes f i n a l on the date i t is mailed, and any
f u r t h e r appeal must be made w i t h i n 30 days from the date of m a i l i n g . Your
appeal must be submitted i n w r i t i n g to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah. To f i l e an
appeal w i t h the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the
Court a P e t i t i o n f o r Writ of Review s e t t i n g f o r t h the reasons f o r appeal,

WILLIAM R. COMER
S.S.A. No. 523-08-6111
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pursuant to §63-465-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing
Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Dated this 17th day of January, 1989.
Date Mailed:

January 25, 1989.

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on t h i s , £ $ day of January, 1989 by mailing the same, postage prepaid, United States
mail to:
Ms. Clare A. Jones
Attorney-Advisor

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
Hill Air Force Base, Utah 84056-5990
A i r Force-Hill A i r Force Base
2849 ABG/DPCEB

Civilian Personnel, D. Mabey
Hill AFB, Utah 34056
David J. Knowlton
Attorney at Law
2910 Washington, Suite 305
Ogden, Utah 84401
William R. Comer
4364 Palmer Road
Erda, Utah 84074
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Presidential Documents

VdL 51, No. ISO
Wtdattdsy, Stpcsmbtt 17, lfse
Title 9—

Executive Order 125*4 of September 15f 1986

The President

Drug-Free Federal Workplace
I RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that:
Drug use is having serious adverse effects upon a significant proportion of the
national work force and results in billions of dollars of lost productivity each
yean
The Federal government as an employer, is concerned with the well-being of
its employees, the successful accomplishment of agency missions, and the
need to maintain employee productivity;
The Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation, can and
should show the wjy towards achieving drug-free workplaces through a
program designed to offer drug users a helping hand and at the same time.
demonstrating to drug users and potential drug users that drugs will not be
tolerated in the Federal workplace;
The profits from illegal drugs provide the single greatest source of income for
organized crime, fuel violent street crime, and otherwise contribute to the
breakdown of our society,
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees is inconsistent
not only with the law-abiding behavior expected of all citizens, but also with
the special trust placed in such employees as servants of the public;
Federal employees who use illegal drugs, on or off duty, tend to be less
productive, less reliable, and prone to greater absenteeism than their fellow
employees who do not use illegal drugs;
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees .impairs the
efficiency of Federal departments and agencies, undermines public confidence
in them, and makes it more difficult for other employees who do not use illegal
drugs to perform their jobs effectively. The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty,
by Federal employees also can pose a serious health and safety threat to
members of the public and to other Federal employees;
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees in certain
positions evidences less than the complete reliability, stability, and good
judgment that is consistent with access to sensitive information and creates
the possibility of coercion, influence, and irresponsible action under pressure
that may pose a serious risk to national security, the public safety, and the
effective enforcement of the law; and
Federal employees who use illegal drugs must themselves be primarily responsible for changing their behavior and if necessary, begin the process of
rehabilitating themselves.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America, including section 3301(2) of Title 5 of the United
States Code, section 7301 of Title 5 of the United States Code, section 290ee-l
of Title 42 of the United States Code, deeming such action in the best interests
of national security, public health and safety, law enforcement and the
efficiency of the Federal service, and in order to establish standards and
procedures to ensure fairness in achieving a drug-free Federal workplace and
to protect the privacy of Federal employees, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section L Drug-Free Workplace.
(a) Federal employees are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs.

Ateh 1

(b) The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees, whether on duty or off duty,
is contrary to the efficiency of the service.
(c) Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment
Sec 2. Agency Responsibilities.
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall develop a plan for achieving the
objective of a drug-free workplace with due consideration of the rights of the
government the employee, and the general public.
(b) Each agency plan shall include:
(1) A statement of policy setting forth the agency's expectations regarding
drug use and the action to be anticipated in response to identified drug use:
(2) Employee Assistance Programs emphasizing high level direction, education, counseling, referral to rehabilitation, and coordination with available
community resources;
(3) Supervisory training to assist in identifying and addressing illegal drug use
by agency employees;
i4) Provision for self-referrals as well as supervisory referrals to treatment
with maximum respect for individual confidentiality consistent with safety
and security issues; and
(5) Provision for identifying illegal drug users, including testing on a controlled
and carefully monitored basis in accordance with this Order.
Sec 3. Drug Testing Programs.
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to test for the
use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The extent to which
such employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be determined
by the head of each agency, based upon the nature of the agency's mission
and its employees' duties, the efficient use of agency resources, and the
danger to the public health and safety or national security that could result
from the failure of an employee adequately to discharge his or her position.
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program for voluntary
employee drug testing.
(c) In addition to the testing authorized in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section, the head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee
for illegal drug use under the following circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion tot any employee uses illegal drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or.
unsafe practice; or
(3) As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation for illegal drug
use through an Employee Assistance Program.
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for
illegal drug use.
Sec 4. Drug Testing Procedures.
(a) Sixty days prior to the implementation of a drug testing program pursuant
to this Order, agencies shall notify employees that testing for use of illegal
drugs is to be conducted and that they may seek counseling and rehabilitation
and inform them of the procedures for obtaining such assistance through the
agency's Employee Assistance Program. Agency drug testing programs already ongoing are exempted from the 60-day notice requirement Agencies
may take action under section 3(c) of this Order without reference to the 60day notice period

(b) Before conducting a drug test the agency shall inform the employee to be
tested of the opportunity to submit medical documentation that may support a
legitimate use for a specific drug.
(c) Drug testing programs shall contain procedures for timely submission of
requests for retention of records and specimens; procedures for retesting; and
procedures, consistent with applicable law, to protect the confidentiality of
test results and related medical and rehabilitation records. Procedures for
providing urine specimens must allow individual privacy, unless the agency
has reason to believe that a particular individual may alter or substitute the
specimen to be provided
(d) The Secretary of Health and Human Services Is authorized to promulgate
scientific and technical guidelines for drug testing programs, and agencies
shall conduct their drug testing programs in accordance with these guidelines
once promulgated.
Sac 5. Personnel Actions.
(a} Agencies shall in addition to any appropriate personnel actions, refer any
employee who is found to use illegal drugs to an Employee Assistance
Program for assessment counseling, and referral for treatment or rehabilitation as appropriate.
(b) Agencies shall Initiate action to discipline any employee who is found to
use illegal drags, provided that snch action is not required for an employee
who:
(1) Voluntarily identifies hiitf»ef as a user of illegal drugs or who volunteers
for drug testing pursuant to section 3(b) of this Order, prior to being identified
through other means;
(2) Obtains counseling or xehabdxtatiaa through an Employee Assistance
Program; and
(3] Thereafter refrainsfromusing illegal drugs.
(c) Agencies shall not allow any employee to remain on duty in a sensitive
position who is found to use illegal drugs, prior to successful completion of
rehabilitation through an Employee Assistance Program. However, as part of a
rehabilitation or counseling program, the head of an Executive agency may, in
his or her discretion, allow an employee to return to duty in a sensitive
position if it is determined that tins action would not pose a danger to public
health or safety or the national security.
(d) Agencies shall initiate action to remove from the service any employee
who is found to use illegal drugs and:
(1) Refuses to obtain counseling or rehabilitation through an Employee Assistance Program; or
(2) Does not thereafter refrain from using illegal drugs.
(e) The results of a drug test and information developed by the agency in the
course of the drug# testing of the employee may be considered in processing
any adverse action against the employee or for other administrative purposes.
Preliminary test results may not be used in an administrative proceeding
unless they are confirmed by a second analysis of the same sample or unless
the employee confirms the accuracy of tbe initial test by admitting the use of
illegal drugs.
(f) The determination of an agency that an employee uses illegal drugs can be
made on the basis of any appropriate evidence, including direct observation, a
criminal conviction, administrative inquiry, or the results of an authorized
testing program. Positive drug test results may be rebutted by other evidence
that an employee has not used illegal drugs.
(g) Any action to discipline an employee who is using illegal drugs (including
removal from the service, if appropriate) shall be taken in compliance with
otherwise applicable procedures, including the Civil Service Reform Act.

(h) Drug testing shall not be conducted pursuant to this Order for the purpose
of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings. Agencies are not
required to report to the Attorney General for investigation or prosecution any
information, allegation* or evidence relating to violations of Title 21 of the
United States Code received as a result of the operation of drug testing
programs established pursuant to this Order.
Sec 8. Coordination of Agency Programs.
(a) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall:
(1} Issue government-wide guidance to agencies on the implementation of the
terms of this Order
(2) Ensure that appropriate coverage for drug abuse is maintained for employees and their families under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program:
(3) Develop a model Employee Assistance Program for Federal agencies and
assist the agencies in putting programs in place;
(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, develop
and improve training programs for Federal supervisors and managers on
illegal drug use: and
(5) In cooperation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
heads of Executive agencies, mount an intensive drug awareness campaign
throughout the Federal work force,
(b) The Attorney General shall render legal advice regarding the implementation of this Order and shall be consulted with regard to all guidelines.
regulations, and policies proposed to be adopted pursuant to this Order.
(c) Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to limit the authorities of the
Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947, as
amended, or the statutory authorities of the National Security Agency or the
Defense Intelligence Agency. Implementation of this Order within the Intelligence Community, as defined in Executive Order No. 12333, shall be subject to
the approval of the head of the affected agency.
Sec 7. Definitions.
(a) This Order applies to all agencies of the Executive Branch.
(b) For purposes of this Order, the term "agency" means an_Executive agency,
as defined in 5 U.S.C 105; the Uniformed Services, as defined in 5 U.S.C.
2101(3) (but excluding the armed forces as defined by 5 U.S.C- 2101(2)); or any
other employing unit or authority of the Federal government, except the
United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission* and employing
units or authorities in the Judicial and Legislative Branches.
(c) For purposes of this Order, the term "illegal drugs'* means a controlled
substance included in Schedule I or II, as defined by section 802(6) of Title 21
of the United States Code, the possession of which is unlawful under chapter
'13 of that Title. The term "illegal drugs" does not mean the use of a controlled
jubstance pursuant to a valid prescription or other uses authorized by law.
(d) For purposes of this Order, the term "employee in a sensitive position"
refers to:
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive, or Noncritical-Sensitive under Chapter 731 of the
Federal Personnel Manual or an employee in a position that an agency head
designates as sensitive in accordance with Executive Order No. 10450. as
amended;
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information or
may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a determination of
trustworthiness by an agency head under Section 4 of Executive Order No.
123S8;
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments:

(4) Law enforcement officers as defined in 5 U.S.C 8331(20); and
(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law enforcement
national security, the protection of life and property, public health or safety, or
other functions requiring a high degree of trust and confidence.
(e) For purposes of this Order, the term "employee'* means all persons
appointed in the Civil Service as described in 5 U.S.C. 2105 (but excluding
persons appointed in the armed services as defined in 5 tLS.G 2102(2]].
(f) For purposes of this Order, the term "Employee Assistant* Program**
means agency-based counseling programs that offer assessment short-term
counseling, and referral services to employees for a wide range of drug,
alcohol, and mental health programs that affect employee job performance.
Employee Assistance Programs are responsible for referring drug-using employees for rehabilitation and for monitoring employees' progress while in
treatment
SeK. a. Effective Date. This Order is effective immediately.
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R475-21a. Combined Wage Claims
R475-22. Definition of Terms in Employment Security Act
R475-22J. Included Employment
R475-22ra. Unemployment
R475-22p Wages
R475-35b. Extended Benefits
R475-35f. Required Public Announcement
R475-45 Wage Freeze Following Workmen's
CompensaUon

R475-2-2. Evidentiary Requirements
The evidentiary requirement for Department decisions is a preponderance of the evidence It is not
necessary to meet criminal court standards of beyond
reasonable doubt or overwhelming evidence Preponderance means evidence which is of greater weight
or more convincing than the evidence which is
offered in opposition to it, that is, evidence which as
a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is
more probable than not Although the evidence that
is required for an appeal decision must be of probaR475-2. Purpose of Employment
tive value, an initial determination must be made
Security Act
based on the best or most logical information available Sworn testimony or first-hand statements have
R475-2-1. Preamble
greater believability than unsworn statements or
R475-2-2. Evidentiary Requirements
hearsay A great deal of information is provided to
the Department through telephone conversations and
R475-2-1. Preamble
written reports. While the information provided in
1 One of the purposes of the Employment Secu- this manner will always be considered by the Deparrity Act is to lighten the burdens of persons unemptment, it cannot be relied upon more than credible
loyed through no fault of their own by maintaining
sworn testimony when the parties have been given an
their purchasing power in the economy The legisla- I opportunity to present evidence in person
ture, in estabhsrung this program, recognized the
Hearsay, which is information provided by a
substantial social ills associated with unemployment
I source whose credibility cannot be tested through
and sought to ameliorate these problems with a
/ cross-examination, has inherent infirmities which
program to pay workers for a limited time while they
make it unreliable The failure of one party to
seek other employment It is because of these reasons
provide
information either initially or at the appeals
that it is in the public interest to liberally construe
hearing severely limits the amount and quality of
and administer the Act It is important that both the
information upon which to base a good decision
worker seeking benefits and the employer who will
ultimately pay for such benefits understand the Therefore, it is necessary for all parties to actively
participate in the decision making process by proviprocess by which contributions are assessed and
ding accurate and complete information in a timely
benefits are paid The following Rules are written to
manner to assure the protection of the interests of
explain and clarify the application of the Act In
each party and preserve the social integrity of the
applying these Rules to individual cases the Departunemployment insurance system
ment will consider the reasonableness of claimant's
19S7 35-4-2
action, the totality of the employment situation, and
whether the claimant has a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market
R475-3a. Bi-Weekly Payment of
Benefits
2 The Utah Department of Employment Security
has an obligation to be unbiased m administration of
R475-3a-l. General Definition
the Act Therefore, the Department must allow all
parties due process betore dispensing the revenues
R475-3a-l. General Definition
provided by the Employment Security Act in order to
Eligibility for benefits is established with regard to
protect the investment of employers who contributed
a calendar week Benefits shall be paid on a bito the unemployment insurance fund, the interests of
weekly basis Therefore, benefits will not become due
the unemployed workers who may be eligible for the
until the end of a two-week period for which bendollars provided by the fund, and the community
efits are claimed in accordance with regulations
which benefits from a stable workforce through the
governing the filing of claims
maintenance of purchasing power Due process req19S7 35-Wa
uires that employers will not be charged contributions for benefits, and workers will not be denied
benefits, without the opportunity to provide infor- R475-3b. Weekly Benefit Amount
mation and contest or refute the information consiR475-3b-l. General Definition
dered m the decision making process
R475-3b-2. Total Wages
3 When an eligible worker has jio work available R475-3b-3. Early Determination
there exists no controversy between the worker, the
R475-3b-4. Revision of Regular Monetary Determination
employer, or the Department and benefits must be R475-35-5. Wages Paid
paid promptly if all the provisions of Act are met.
R475-3b-6. Wages Paid During the Quarter
R475-35-7. Calendar Quarter
However, when a worker quits, is fired, or has any
R475-35-8. Retirement or Disability Retirement Income
other issue under the law an investigation of the circumstances must take place to determine if benefits
can be paid In determining whether or not the I R475-3b~l. General Definition
worker is eligible for benefits, his actions arc measThis section of the Act outlines the procedure for
ured against the standards of just cause following a ! determining the Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) and
discharge, and good cause and equity and good the Maximum Benefit Amount (MBA) which an eliconscience following a voluntary separation from gible claimant can receive and recomputations based
employment When one party fails to provide infor- on retirement income. Claimants are instructed when
mation or when that information is less credible, the filing the initial claim to report all base period empresult is that the party who has the responsibdity to loyers. Employers are required by law to reporr to
provide information may not prevail in its position.
the Department the wages paid to all employees
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at the time he files the first claim to be monetarily
eligible for a second claim after the first benefit year
ends. However, before benefits can be allowed on the
second claim, the claimant who has received compensation during the first benefit year is required to
have had work since the beginning of such year in
order to qualify for compensation in his next benefit
year.
R475-4g-2. Successive Benefit Year
A successive benefit year is not limited to a claim
that begins the week following the last week of the
original benefit year (transitional claim), but may
affect any claimant who files a second claim.
R475-4g-3. Subsequent Employment
The elements of subsequent employment necessary
to meet the requirements of this provision of the Act
are:
1. Insured Work
The earnings must be in "covered employment*
subject to a State or Federal unemployment insurance program (including railroad employment) which
can be used to establish monetary eligibility for
unemployment insurance benefits.
2. The work must have been performed after the
effective date of the original claim, but not necessarily during the benefit year of the original claim.
3. Actual services must have been performed, not
just the establishment of covered wages attributable
to a period of time subsequent to the effective date
of the original claim such as vacation or severance
pay.
4. The covered earnings must be equal to at least
six times the weekly benefit amount of the original or
subsequent claim, whichever is lower.
R475-4g-4. Period of Disqualification
If the claimant meets the requirements of monetary
eligibility under Section 35-4-4(0, he may establish
a claim but benefits would be denied under this
section from the effective date of the claim until the
week in which the claimant provides proof of earnings from subsequent employment as required to
remove the disqualification.
a. Exception to Disqualification
The provisions of this section do not apply unless
the claimant actually received compensation during
the original benefit year. If the claimant never filed
for a compensable week; was disqualified and no
benefit checks were issued; or the original claim
could be canceled under the Rules pertaining to
Section 35-4-4(a), , : a disqualification under this
section would not be assessed.
19T7

35-Mf

R475-5a. Voluntary Leaving
R475-5a-U General Information
R475-5a-2. Good Cause
R475-5a-J. Equity and Good Conscience
R475-5a-4. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a Spouse
R475-5a-5. Evidence and Borden of Proof
R475-5a-6. Quit or Discharge
R475-5a-7. Examples of Specific Reasons for Separations
R475-5a-S. Effective Dale of Disqualification

R475-5a-l. General Informatioa
Voluntarily leaving work means that the employee
severed the employment relationship as contrasted to
a separation initiated by the employer. This is true
regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons
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were for making the decision to leave the work.
Voluntary leaving will include not only leaving existing work, but also the failure to return to work after
a lay-off, suspension; or period of absence. Voluntary leaving also includes failure to renew a contract
as in the case of a school teacher or athlete. The Act
requires two standards of consideration following a
voluntary separation from employment: good cause
and equity and good conscience. If the claimant fails
to establish good cause for leaving work, unemployment insurance benefits will not be denied if a
denial of benefits would be contrary to the equity
and good conscience standard. It is necessary to
assess the totality of the employment situation.
Where there are mitigating circumstances it may not
be equitable to deny benefits.
R475-5a-2. Good Cause
1. Good cause is established if continuance of the
employment would have had an adverse effect on the
claimant which could not be controlled or prevented
and necessitated immediate severance of the employment relationship, or if the work was illegal, or
unsuitable new work.
a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances which made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh the
benefits of remaining employed. There must be a
showing of actual or potential physical, mental,
economic, personal or professional harm caused or
aggravated by continuance in the employment. The
claimant's reason(s) for belief of the consequences of
remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary;
substantial, not trifling. These circumstances must be
applied as to the average individual, not the supersensitive.
b. Ability to Control or Prevent
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect
on the claimant, good cause is not established if the
claimant:
(1) reasonably could have continued working while
looking for other employment, or
(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have
made it possible for him to preserve his job through
approved leave, transfer, or adjustment to personal
circumstances, etc. or,
(3) had not given the employer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship so the employer
would have an opportunity to make adjustment
which would alleviate the need to quit. An employee
with grievances about his employment must show an
effort to work out the problems with the employer
unless such efforts would be futile.
c. Illegal
Good cause is established if the individual was
required to violate State or Federal law or his legal
rights were violated; provided the employer was
aware of the violation and refused to comply with
the law.
d. Unsuitable New Work
Good cause may also be established if a claimant
left new work which after a short trial period is
shown to be materially unsuitable for the claimant
consistent with the requirements of the suitable work
test in Section 35-4-5(cXU and (2) of the Act. The
fact that a job was accepted does not, in and of
itself; make the job suitable. The longer a job is
held, the more it tends to set the standard by which
the suitability of the job is to be judged. After a
reasonable period of time a contention that the quit
CODE* Co
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was motivated by unsuitability ot the job is no longer
persuasive.
R475-5a-3. Equity and Good Conscience
When the circumstances of the quit were not sufficiently compelling to justify an allowance of benefits for good cause, but there were mitigating circumstances, and a denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an afront to fairness, benefits may
be allowed under the provisions of equity and good
conscience if all of the following- elements are
present:
a. the decision is made in cooperation with the
employer by giving the employer an opportunity to
provide information;
b. the claimant acted reasonably;
c. a denial would be inconsistent with the intent of
the unemployment insurance program; and
d. the claimant demonstrated a contmued attachment to the labor market.
2. The elements of equity and good conscience are
defined as follows:
a. In Cooperation with the Employer
In administering the unemployment insurance
program, the intent of the Department is to maintain
a careful balance between claimants and employers
and to make fairness the uppermost consideration.
The employer is given an opportunity to provide
information when the Department notifies him that a
former employee has filed a claim for benefits. Such
notice provides an opportunity to explain the reason
for separation. The employer is also notified of any
appeal with regard to the separation except as provided under Section 35-4-4<e).
b. The Claimant Acted Reasonably
Reasonable is defined as those actions which make
the decision to quit logical, sensible or practical. The
actions which might be acceptable for a member of a
subculture are not the norm by which reasonableness
is established. There must be mitigating circumstances which, although not compelling, may be considered as motivating a reasonable person to take
similar action.
c. Consistent with the Purposes of the Act
The intent of the Act is to temper the hardships
associated with unemployment and to provide stability for the economy by maintaining purchasing
power, individual skills and a stable workforce.
d. Continued Attachment to the Labor Market.
The claimant establishes his contmued attachment
to the labor market by taking positive action(s) which
could result in employment during the first week
after leaving work and each week thereafter. Attachment to the labor market is demonstrated by such
actions as making contacts with prospective employers, preparing resumes, developing job leads, etc.
Such a work search should have been undertaken
without instructions from the Department. Failure to
show attachment to the labor market during the first
week of unemployment may be allowed if it was not
practical for the individual to seek work in circumstances such as: illness, hospitalization, incarceration,
or for other reasons beyond the control of the claimant provided a worksearch was commenced as soon
as practical.
R475-5a-4. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a
Spouse
1. An individual leaves work without good cause,
regardless of the reason for the move, if he or she
quit to move with, follow or jom, a lawful wife or
husband, to or in a new place of residence from
which it is not practical to commute to the employCODE •&>
Provo. Utah
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mem Even if such necessitous circumstances as the
expense of maintaining two separate households, or
the need to keep a family together, were factors m
the decision to move, benefits cannot be allowed.
The Utah Legislature has chosen not to insure this
aspect ot domestic life. The only exception to this
provision is where a claimant quits to accompany a
spouse who is compelled to move to a new locale for
medical reasons which are beyond the control of the
spouse.
R475-5a-5. Evidence and Burden of Proof
Since the claimant is the moving party m a voluntary separation, he is the best source of information
with regard to the reasons for the quit. The claimant
has the burden of proof and must show that he had
"good cause* for quitting, or that he meets the requirements for allowance under the equity and good
conscience provision before benefits can be allowed.
R475-5a-6. Quit or Discharge
1. Refusal to Follow Instructions
Constructive
Abandonment
If the claimant knew his job would be forfeit upon
failure to follow reasonable requests or instructions,
but chose not to comply, the resultant separation was
a quit, not a discharge.
2. Leaving Prior to Effective Date of Termination
a. When a worker leaves prior to the date of an
impending reduction in force, he will be considered
to have quit. A worker has an obligation to remain
on the job until the work is completed. Notice of an
impending layoff is not good cause to leave in order
to get a head start in searching for other work.
However, the duration of available work may be a
mitigating factor in determining good cause of equity
and good conscience, depending upon the reason for
the decision to quit. If it is determined that the claimant is not disqualified under Section 35-4-5(a),
benefits shall be denied under Section 35-4-4(c)
for the hunted period of time the claimant had been
told by the employer that he could have contmued
working, as he failed to accept all available, suitable
work for such weeks.
b. An individual cannot escape a disqualification
under Section 35-4-5(b)(l) by quitting in advance
of a virtually certain discharge which would result m
a denial of benefits. Such a separation shall be
treated as a discharge.
3. Leaving Work Because of a Disciplinary Action
If the disciplinary action or suspension is reasonable and non-discnminatory, leaving work rather
than submit to such actions, or failing to return to
work at the end of the suspension, is considered to
be a voluntary quit without good cause unless the
claimant was previously disqualified under the provisions of Section 35-4-5(b)(l).
4. Failure to Return at the End of a Leave of
Absence
When a claimant takes a leave of absence for any
reason and files a claim while still on leave from his
employer, he will be considered "unemployed* even
though he still has an attachment to the employer.
However, his reason for taking the leave of absence
will determine if he had good cause for quitting. If
the claimant fads to return to work at the end of the
leave of absence, this is also considered a voluntary
quit which must result in a denial of benefits if the
claimant cannot show good cause or that a denial
would be contrary to equity and good conscience.
5. Leaving Due to a Remark or Action of the
Employer or a Co-Worker
When a worker interprets remarks of co-workers
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or supervisors to mean he is to be discnarged, the
jobs If the job is to begin at a future date which is
claimant has the responsibility to assure himself,
tentative and dependent on circumstances which
prior to leaving that the employer intended to termcannot be definitely predicted the claimant does not
mate the employment relationship and to contmue
have good cause for leavmg work
working until the date of the discharge If he fails to
2 Part time Work and Reduction of Hours
do so, or was not to be discharged, he left work I a The reduction of an employee's working hours
voluntarily
! alone is not good cause for leavmg the job A reas6 Resignation Intended
i onable person will remain partially employed as
opposed to severing the relationship with the empla. When a worker submits his resignation to be
effective at some definite future date, but is discha- oyer If the claimant is earning less than his weekly
benefit amount, he could receive a partial unemplorged prior to that date, the leaving is involuntary
yment insurance check even though he has not been
because the immediate cause of the separation is the
separated from the employer In extreme cases,
result of the employer's action However, the worker
however, a reduction of hours may be so detrimental
who states that he is quittmg, but agrees to contmue
to the employee that the circumstances justify
working for an indefinite period of time and will
leaving All of the following elements are necessary
leave at the convenience of the employer, leaves
to establish good cause for quittmg without first
voluntarily even though the date of separation is
obtaining other employment
determined by the employer
(1) The reduction involves a substantial number of
b When a worker resigns and later changes his
hours in proportion to the number of hours normally
mind and attempts to remain employed, the reasonworked
ableness of the employer's refusal to contmue the
employment is the determining factor in deciding if
(2) The reduction is permanent or expected to be
the claimant quit or was discharged For example if
of a long duration
the employer had already hired a replacement, or
(3) The reduction in hours causes a senous finantaken other action because of the claimant's impen- cial burden, or adverse effect on personal circumstding quit, it may not be practical for the employer to
ances such as transportation, childcare, etc , resulting
allow the claimant to withdraw his resignation and it
in a real hardship and fhe claimant could not make
would be held that the separation was voluntary
reasonable adjustments to his personal circumstances
prior to quitting
R475-5a-7 Examples of Specific Reasons for
(4) The claimant was not advised at the time he
Separations
was hired that a reduction of hours was possible or
In all the following examples, the basic elements of
pendmg or the reduction in the hours was not a
good cause or equity and good conscience must be
customary and known condition of the job as in the
considered in determining eligibility for benefits The
case of school employees or seasonal workers
following examples do not include all reasons for
(5) The reduction was not at the request of the
leaving employment
claimant, was beyond the claimant's control, and the
1 Prospects of Other Work
claimant attempted m good faith to avoid the reduGood cause is established if at the time of separaction in hours (except where such an attempt was
tion the claimant had a definite and immediate assclearly futile) by discussing the circumstances with
urance of another job or self-employment that was
the employer and accepting all work which was reareasonably expected to be full-time and permanent
sonably available
Occasionally, after giving notice, but prior to leavmg
b If any of the foregoing five elements are not
the first job, the individual learns that the new job
present and good cause cannot be shown, the proviwill not be available when promised, permanent, fullsions of equity and good conscience may apply where
time, or otherwise suitable Good cause is established
there are mitigating circumstances or the reduction in
in such circumstances if the claimant immediately
hours was substantially unfair to the claimant Mitiattempted, unless such an attempt was obviously
gating circumstances include such things as (1) profutile, to rescind his notice of impendmg quit and
spects of full-time work exist, but cannot be
continue working with his current employer
pursued while continuing to work part-tune, (2) the
However, if it is apparent the claimant knew, or
employer
failed to comply with prior representations
should have known, about the unsuitabdity of the
he made to the claimant, (3) the claimant made prior
new work, but quits the first job and subsequently
concessions for the benefit of the employer such as
also leaves the new job, a disqualification will apply
specialized training, relocation, etc , (4) the reduction
from the time the claimant quit thefirstjob
in
hours was not equitably distributed or based on a
a. A definite assurance of another job means that
rational basis, such as seniority or job requirements
the claimant has personally been in contact with
3 Personal Circumstances
someone in authority to hire, been given a definite
There may be personal circumstances which are
date to begin working and told under what conditions he will be hired. If he has been told of a possi- sufficiently compelling or create sufficient hardship
to justify leavmg work, provided the individual made
bility of a job opening and to report at the job site
reasonable attempts to make adjustments or find
this circumstance implies only that he will be consialternatives
dered for hire, not a definite assurance of lure Mere
4 Leavmg to Attend School
rumors of job openings are not job offers Prospects
Leavmg work to attend school might be justified
of other work developed after leaving are relevant
only m showing a genuine attachent to the labor on general principles but is not good cause for becoming unemployed within the meaning of the Act.
force.
5. Conscientious Objection
b. An immediate assurance of another job means
For religious concerns to establish good cause for
that the prospective job will begin within two weeks, ]
quittmg there must be evidence that the effects of
barring necessitous circumstances, of the last day of
continuing work would conflict with good faith,
work on the job he is leavmg. Benefits would be
honestly held religious convictions. This does not
denied under the provisions of Section 35-4-4<c) if
necessarily mean that any personal belief, no matter
the claimant files during the interim between the two
how unique, is entitled to this protection However,
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beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others or shared by all members
of a religious sect in order to be good faith religious
convictions. Where the individual was not called
upon, as a condition of his employment, to violate
his religious beliefs, he is not compelled to quit. A
general abhorrence of war does not show a compelling need to quit work at an armory nor does membership in a religion which counsels _against the use
of alcohol preclude employment in a grocery store or
restaurant where alcoholic beverages are sold. A
decision not to continue working under conditions
which conflict with convictions does not justify
leaving work unless there is evidence of a good faith
change in personal convictions as shown by a change
in lifestyle. However, a change in the job requiring
work in conflict with personal or religious convictions is good cause for leaving if the claimant has not
previously worked under such conditions and the
employer will not make adjustments.
6. Distance
An employee has the responsibility to arrange
transportation to and from work within normal
commuting patterns, unless it is customary in that
job or occupation for the employer to provide transportation. When lack of transportation, beyond the
control of the individual, prevents continuance of the
work, good cause may be established provided the
claimant has no other alternate means of transportation. An individual's preference for a discontinued
mode of transportation to a substantially equal one is
not good cause. The mere inconvenience of one kind
of transportation as compared with another should
not be confused with hardship. When a change in
residence results in an increased distance to work
beyond normal commuting patterns, the reason for
the move, not the distance to the work, is the factor
which determines if the claimant quit with good
cause.
7. Marriage
a. When an individual leaves work to be married,
such a personal choice is not good cause for quitting,
even if the intended residence of the couple was too
far for the claimant to commute to the work.
b. When the employer has a rule that requires
separation of an employee who marries a coworker, the separation is involuntary even though the
employer may leave it to the couple to decide who
will leave.
8. Health or Physical Condition
a. A worker generally consults a physician prior to
quitting to determine if the job was actually a factor
contributing to the health problem. Although it is
not essential for the claimant to have been advised by
a physician to quit, a contention that health problems required the separation must be established by
competent evidence. Even if the work causes or
aggravates a health problem, if there are alternatives,
such as treatment or medication, or the conditions of
the work can be changed to alleviate the problem,
good cause for quitting is not established.
b. Leaving work because of an employer's failure
to comply with government regulations concerning
health and safety is good cause provided the employer was told of the problem and did not take corr-ective action. The degree of risk to health and safety
must be substantial before leaving could be considered good cause.
'c. Some conditions of work, although meeting
government safety and health standards, may present
an undue risk to a particular worker because of
unique personal conditions. Allergy is one example
CODE»CO
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of unique circumstances that might require a job
change or adjustment. However, if the nsk to health
or safety is one borne by ail those employed in the
occupation and the claimant fails to show he was
affected to a greater extent than the other workers in
the same occupation, good cause for leaving is not
established. A fear of potential health and safety
problems is not good cause for quitting unless the
claimant can show that the fear is justified.
d. Pregnancy is treated as any other temporary
disability. Employers generally provide maternity
leave if leave is provided for other medical disabilities. If leave is available, the claimant voluntarily
quits by failing to accept or arrange leave or failing
to return at the end of the leave.
9. Retirement and Pension
Leaving work solely to accept retirement benefits is
not a compelling reason for quitting. Although it
may be reasonable for an individual to take advantage of a retirement benefit, payment of unemployment benefits in such a circumstance would not be
consistent with the intent of the Unemployment Insurance program, and, therefore, a denial of benefits
would not be contrary to equity and good conscience. However, if the employer required the employee to leave work at a certain age, or after an established number of years, the separation was involuntary.
10. Sexual Harassment
a. A claimant may have good cause for leaving if
the quit was due to discriminatory and unlawful
sexual harassment, provided the employer was given
a chance to take necessary action to alleviate the
objectionable conduct. Sexual harassment is a form
of sex discrimination which is prohibited by Title VII
of the U. S. Civil Rights Act. Sexual harassment is
intimidation by a person of either sex against a
person of the opposite or same sex. For sexual harassment to be discriminatory, the following three
elements must be shown to exist:
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a
sexual nature which adversely affects a person's
employment relationship or working environment, if:
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit
or implicit term or condition of employment, or
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is
used as a basis for an employment decision affecting
the person, or
(c) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment,
(2) Unsolicited, deliberately sexual statements,
gestures or physical contacts which are objectionable
to the recipient,
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace,
destroys morale and offends legal and social standards of acceptable behavior.
b. Inappropriate behavior which has sexual connotation but does not meet the test of sexual discrimination is insufficient to establish good cause for
leaving work.
11. Discrimination
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions* or privileges of employment,
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify
employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive an individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of the individual's race, color, religion.
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employment relationship. The discharge must have
been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to
R475-5a-8. Effective Date of Disqualification
the employer's rightful interests. A discharge would
1. The disqualification under this section technicnot be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent
ally begins with the week the claimant voluntarily
with reasonable employment practices. The wrongquit the job. However, to avoid the confusion which
ness of the conduct must be considered in the context
arises when a disqualification is made for a period of
of the particular employment and how it affects the
time prior to the filing of a claim, the claimant will
employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated
be notified that benefits are denied beginning with
incident of poor judgment and there is no expectathe effective date of a new or reopened claim. The
tion that the conduct will be continued or repeated,
disqualification continues until the claimant returns
potential harm may not be shown and therefore it is
to work in a bona fide covered employment and
not necessary to discharge the employee.
earns six times his weekly benefit amount after the
(1) Longevity and prior work record are important
week in which the claimant left work. A disqualification which begins in one benefit year will continue in determining if the act or omission is an isolated
into a new benefit year unless purged by subsequent I incident or a good faith error in judgment. An
employee who has historically complied with work
earnings.
2. If an individual is receiving remuneration which rules does not demonstrate by a single violation, even
is attributed to a period of time following the last though harmful, that such violations will be repeated
day of work, such as severance or vacation pay, the and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm
"week in which the claimant left work" is considered to the employer. For example: A long term employee
who does not have a history oi tardiness or absentto be the last week for which such remuneration was
attributable as an individual is not "unemployed" eeism is absent without leave for a number of days
while receiving remuneration from an employer, and due to a death in his immediate family. Although
such severance- or vacation pay cannot be used to this is a violation of the employer's rules and may
establish just cause for discharging a new employee,
purge a disqualification.
the fact that the employee has established over a long
1987 35-4-5.
period of time that he complies with attendance rules
shows that the circumstance is more of an isolated
R475-5b. Discharge and Discharge for
incident rather than a violation of the rules that is or
could be expected to be habitual. In this case because
Crime
the potential for harm to the employer is not shown,
R475-5b-l. Discharge
it is not necessary for the employer to discharge the
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Crime
employee, and therefore just cause is not established,
b. Knowledge
R475-5b-l. Discharge
The employee must have had a knowledge of the
I. General Definition
'conduct which the employer expected. It is not necOrdinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in essary that the claimant intended to cause harm to
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the the employer, but he should reasonably have been
"just cause" provisions of the Act. Just cause is able to anticipate the effect his conduct would have.
defined as a job separation that is necessary due to Knowledge may not be established unless the emplthe seriousness of actual or potential harm to the oyer gave a clear, explanation of the expected behaemployer provided the claimant had knowledge of vior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the
the employer's expectations and had control over the case of a flagrant violation of a universal standard of
circumstances which ltd to the discharge. Just cause behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear,
is not established if the reason for the discharge is ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowlbaseless, arbitrary or capricious or the employer has edge is not shown. A specific warning is one way of
failed to uniformly, apply reasonable standards to all showing that - the employee had knowledge of the
employees when instituting disciplinary action. The expected conduct. After the employee is given ^ a
purpose of this section is to deny benefits to indivi- warning he should be given an opportunity to correct
duals who bring about their own unemployment by objectionable conduct. Additional violations« occurr conducting themselves, with respect to their emploring- after the warning would be necessary to establish
yment with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of just cause for a discharge.
consideration to such a degree that the employer, was
(1) For Example: When the employer has an estajustified in discharging the employee.' However, when blished procedure of progressive discipline,- such
' an employee is discharged by his employer,; such procedures generally must have been followed in
discharge may have been the result of incompetence, order to establish that the employee had knowledge
lack of skill, or other reasons which aretjeyond the of the expected behavior or the seriousness of the
claimant's control. The question which must be est- act. The exception is that very severe conduct, such
ablished by the evidence is whether the 'claimant is at as criminal actions, may justify immediate discharge
fault in his resulting unemployment.^ Unemployment without following a progressive disciplinary program.
insurance benefits will be denied if the employer had
c. Control
just cause for discharging the employee. However,
The conduct must have been within the power and
not every cause for discharge provides a basis to I capacity of the claimant to control or prevents,
deny benefits. In order to have just cause for disch- I
2. Just cause may not be established when the
arge pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there _ must reason for discharge is based on such things as mere
be some fault on the part of the employee involved.
mistakes, inefficiencyr failure, of < performance as the
II. Just Cause ^
jesult of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isoJ. The basic factors wnicn estaonsn just cause* and' lated instances, good faith errors in judgment or in
are essential for a determination of ineligibility are:
the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or unina. Culpability
tentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These, exa. This is the seriousness of the conduct or,the seve- mples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the
rity of the offense as it affects continuance of the
lack of knowledge or control-. However,* continued
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inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care
exercised by ordinary, reasonable workers in similar
circumstances, may be disquahfymg dependmg on
the reason and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of the employee.
3. The term "just cause" as used m Section 5(b)(1)
does not lessen the requirement that there be some
fault on the part of the employee involved. Prior to
the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Commission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an intentional infliction of harm or intentional disregard of
the employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature m adding the words "just cause" to Section
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive interpretation. While some fault must be present, it is
sufficient that the acts were intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts
have senous effect on. the employee's job or the
employer's interests.
III. Burden of Proof
1 In a discharge, the employer initiates the separation and, as such, is the primary source of information with regard to the reasons for the dismissal
The employer has the burden of proof which is the
responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the
discharge. The employer is required by the Statute in
Section 35-4-11(g) to keep accurate records and to
provide correct information to the Department for
proper administration of the Act. Although the
employer has the burden to establish just cause for
the discharge, if sufficient facts are obtained from
the claimant, a decision will be made based on the
information available The failure of one party to
provide information does not necessarily result m a
ruling favorable to the other party
2. All mterested parties have the right to give rebuttal to information contrary to the interests of that
party
IV. Quit or Discharge
The determination of whether a separation is a
quit or a discharge is made by the Department based
on the circumstances which resulted m the separation. The conclusions on the employer's records, the
separation notice or the claimant's report are not
controlling on the Department.
1. Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation
When an individual notifies an employer that he
intends to leave as of a definite date in the future
and is discharged pnor to that date, the cause for the
separation on the day the separation takes place is
the controlling factor in determining whether it was a
quit or discharge. Although the separation might
have been motivated by the claimant's announced
resignation* the employer was the moving party in
ending the employment pnor to the resignation date.
Therefore, the immediate reason was more closely
related to the employer's action than to the claimant's announced intention to quit. Unless disqualifying conduct is involved, the separation is considered to be for the convenience of the employer.
However, if the employee is merely reheved of work,
responsibilities but is paid through the date of his
announced resignation
quit.

it is not a di*£harce

hut a

2. Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge
When an employee leaves work in anticipation of a
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the
discharge would not be disquahfymg, the separation
is generally considered to be a voluntary quit.
However, an individual who leaves work to avoid
virtually certain discharge for disqualifying conduct
cannot thereby avoid the disquahfymg provisions of
CODE* Co
Provo Uuh
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Section 35-4-5(b), and the separation is considered
a discharge rather than voluntary leavmg
3 Employee Knows His Action will Result in
Discharge
Absence taken without permission, or other actions
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from the
employer, are generally considered a voluntary separation rather than discharge, if the worker was
given a choice of complying or bemg separated
V Disciplinary Suspension or Involuntary Furlough
When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspension or involuntary furlough, he may meet the
definition of "unemployed " If the claimant files
during the suspension or furlough, the reason for the
suspension or furlough must be adjudicated as a
discharge, even though the claimant is still attached
to the employer and expects to return to work. A
suspension which was reasonable and necessary to
prevent potential harm to the employer or to maintain necessary discipline would generally result in a
disqualification under this section provided the elements of control and knowledge are present Failure
to return to work at the the end of the definite
period of suspension or furlough would be considered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be
determined consistent with Section 35-4-5(a), if
the claimant had not been previously denied
VI Proximal Cause
Relauon of Offenses to
Discharge
1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which
motivates the employer to make the decision to terminate the employee's services If the decision has
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated by way
of notice to the employee or the initiation of a personnel action. Although the employer mav learn of
other offenses following the making of the decision
to terminate, the reason for the discharge is limited
to that conduct of which the employer was aware
pnor to making the decision. However, if the employer discharges a person because of some preliminary
evidence of certain conduct, but does not obtain all
of the proof of the conduct until after the separation
notice is given, it could still be concluded that the
discharge was caused by that conduct which the
employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits
will then be determined by considering the extent of
culpability, knowledge and control.
2. When the discharge does not occur immediately
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a
presumption arises that there were other reasons for
the discharge. This relationship between the offense
and the discharge must be established both as to
cause and tune. The presumption that the conduct
was not the cause of the discharge may-be overcome
by a showing that the delay was due to such things as
investigation, arbitration, or hearings conducted with
regard to the employee's conduct. When a grievance
or arbitration is pending with respect to the discharge, the Department's decision will be based on the
information available to the Department. The Department's decision is not binding on the grievance
resolution process or an arbitrator and the decision
of the arbitrator is not binding On the Department.
When an employer is faced with the necessity of a
reduction in his workforce but uses an employee's
pnor conduct as the criteria for determining who- will
be laid off,, the lack of work is the primary motivation or cause of the discharge, not the conduct.
VII. In Connection with Employment
Disquahfymg conduct is not limited to offenses
which take place on the employer's premises or
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during business hours. It is only necessary that the
the employer. Discharge for unjustified absence or
conduct have such "connection" to the employee's
tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker
duties and to the employer's business that it is a
knows that he is violating attendance rules. Such
subject of legitimate and significant concern to the
violations are generally a serious matter of concern
employer. All employers, both public and private
to employers as attendance standards are necessary to
have the right to expect employees to refrain from
maintain order, control, and productivity. Discharge
acts which are detrimental to the business or would
for an attendance violation beyond the control of the
bring dishonor on the business name or the instituworker is not disqualifying unless the worker reasotion. Legitimate interests of employers include, but
nably could have given notice or obtained permission
are not limited to: goodwill, of customers, reputation
consistent with the employer's rules.
of the busmess, efficiency, business costs, morale of
b. In cases of termination for violations of attenemployees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty.
dance standards, the employee's recent history of
attendance shall be considered to determine if the
VIII. Examples of Reasons for Discharge
violation is an isolated incident, or demonstrates a
In ail the following examples, the basic elements of
pattern of unjustified absences within the control of
just cause must be considered in determining eligibithe employee. Flagrant misuse of attendance privillity for benefits. The following examples do not
eges may result in a denial of benefits even if the last
include all reasons for discharge.
incident was beyond the employee's control.
1. Violation of Company Rules
3. Falsification of Work Record
If an employee violates reasonable rules of the
employer and the three elements of culpability,
a. The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/
knowledge and control are established, benefits must
employer relationship. A statement made in an appbe denied.
lication for a job may be considered as connected
with the work, even though it is made before the
a. The reasonableness of the employer's rules will
work begins. An individual begins his obligations as
depend on the necessity for such a rule as it affects
an employee when he makes an application for work.
the employer's interests. Rules which are contrary to
One of those obligations is to give the employer
general public policy or which infringe upon the
truthful answers to all material questions. Any falsrecognized rights and privileges of individuals may
ification of information which may operate to expose
not be reasonable. An employer must have broader
the employer to possible loss, litigation, or damage
prerogatives in regulating conduct when employees
are on the job than when they are not. An employer would be considered material and therefore may
establish culpability. If the claimant made a false
must be able to make rules for employee on-thestatement while applying for work in order to be
job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate
hired, benefits may be denied even if the claimant
business interests of the employer. An employer is
would have otherwise remained unemployed and
not required to impose only minimum standards, but
eligible for the receipt of unemployment benefits
there may be some justifiable cause for violations of
depending upon the degree of knowledge, culpability
rules that are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous
and control.
or exacting. When rules are changed, adequate notice
and reasonable opportunity to comply must be aff4. Insubordination
orded. If the employee believes a rule is unreasonAuthority is required in the work place to maintain
able, he has the responsibility to discuss his concerns
order and efficiency. An employer has the right to
with the employer and give the employer an opport- expect that lines of authority will be maintained; that
unity to take corrective action.
reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be
obeyed; that supervisors will be respected and that
b. Discharges may be regulated by an employment
their authority will not be undermined. In determicontract or collective bargaining agreement. Just
ning when insubordination (resistance to authority)
cause for the discharge is not established if the
employee's conduct was consistent with his rights becomes disqualifying conduct, the fact that there
under such contract or the discharge was contrary to was a disregard of the employer's interests is the
major importance. Merc protests or dissatisfaction
the provisions of such contract.
c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying without an overt art is not in disregard of the emplconduct if it is found that the act was condoned by oyer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a
superior or vulgar or profane language in response to
the employer or was so prevalent as to be customary.
However, when the worker is given notice that the a civil request may be insubordination if it is condconduct will no longer be tolerated, further violations' ucive to disruption of routine, negation df authority
and impairment of efficiency." Mere incompatibility
could result in a denial of benefits.
or emphatic insistence or discussion by an employee
d. Culpability may be established even if the result
who was acting in good faith is not disqualifying
of the violation of the rule does not in and of itself
cause harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of conduct.
5. Loss of License
compliance with rules diminishes the employer's
When an employee loses a license which he knows
ability to have order and control. Culpability is estis required for the performance of the job, and the
ablished if termination of the employee was required
individual had control over the- circumstances which,
to maintain necessary discipline in the company.
resulted in the loss of the license, such conduct is
e. Knowledge of the employer's - standards of
behavior is usually provided in the form of verbal disqualifying. For example, if the claimant worked as
a driver, and lost his license because of a conviction
instructions, written rules and/or warnings.
However, the warning is not always necessary for a for driving under the influence -(DUI), culpability- is
disqualification to apply in cases of violations-of a established if he fails to obtain a permit to drive at
work or the conviction would expose the employer to
serious nature of universal standards of conduct of
which the claimant should have been aware without additional liabilities. The employer cannot authorize
an employee to drive in • violation of the law.-- Also,
being warned.
additional insurance costs or other: liabilities^ are a
2. Attendance Violations
a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and legitimate concern o f the employer.^Knowledge is
established because it is a matter of common knowremain at work within the reasonable requirements of
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ledge in the State of Utah that driving under the
influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and is
punishable by loss of the individual's driving privileges. Judicial notice can be taken of this fact because
a question relative to this matter is on every driver's
license test. He had control in that he made a conscious decision to risk loss of the license when he
failed to make arrangements for transportation prior
to becoming under the influence of intoxicants.
IX. Effective Date of Disqualification
The Act provides that any disqualification under
this section will include "the week in which the claimant was discharged . . . " However, to avoid confusion, the denial of benefits will begin with the
Sunday of the week for which claimant has filed for
benefits.
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Crime
I. General Definition
1. A crime is a punishable act in violation of law;
an offense against the State or the United States.
"Crime" and "Misdemeanor* are synonymous terms;
though in common usage crime is used to denote
offenses of a more serious nature. However, for
example: an insignificant, although illegal act, or the
taking of something which is of little or no value, or
believed to have been abandoned may not be sufficient to establish that a crime was committed as
defined for the application of this section of the Act,
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation
of the law.
2. The duty of honesty is implied in any employment relationship. A worker is obligated to deal with
his employer in truthfulness and good faith. An
-individual discharged for dishonesty constituting a
crime connected with his work is at fault in his resulting unemployment. The 52 week disqualification
for "dishonesty constituting a crime" required by the
statute is a mandatory penalty.
3. The basic factors which are essential for a disqualification under this provision of the law are that
the individual was discharged for a crime that was:
a. In connection with work
b. Dishonesty
c. Admitted or established by a conviction in a
court of law
II. In Connection with Work
The connection to the work is not limited to offenses which take place on the employer's premises or
during business hours. The employer does not have
to be the victim of the crime, but the crime must
adversely affect the employer's rightful interest. It is
necessary that the conduct have a 'connection* to
the employee's duties and to the employer's business
that it is a subject of legitimate and significant
concern. All employers, both public and private,
have the right to expect employees to refrain from
acts which are detrimental to the business or would
bring dishonor on the business name of the institution. ' Legitimate interests of employers include, but
are not limited to: goodwill of customers, reputation
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty.
III. Dishonesty
Dishonesty in this context generally means theft
but may also include other criminal acts connected
with the "work that render the employee untrustworthy or show a lack of integrity. Dishonesty not
involving a crime may still be disaualifvine under
provisions of Section 5(b)(1).
IV. Admission or Conviction in a Court
j
1. An admission is a voluntary acknowledgement
CODE* Co
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made by a claimant that he has committed acts which
are in violation of the law. In this context, the
admission may be a verbal or written statement by
the claimant that he committed the act. The admission does not necessarily have to be made to a Department representative. However, there must be sufficient information to establish that it was not a. false
statement given under duress or made to obtain some
concession.
2. A conviction is when a claimant has been found
guilty by a court of committing acts which are in
violation of the law. When the claimant pleads "no
contest" or agrees to the diversionary program as
provided by the court, this is treated, for the purposes of this section of the Act, the same as a conviction and benefits will be denied.
V. Benefits Held in Abeyance
1. If the claimant has not made an admission, but
is held in legal custody or free on bail, the law requires a withholding of a determination of eligibility.
Benefits cannot be paid unless a determination of
eligibility is made. Failure to pay benefits even
though the burden of proof for a denial under
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because
the court, in holding the claimant in legal custody or
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that
the state has established that a crime has been committed and there is reason to believe the individual
committed that crime. The filing of charges is not the
same as being held in custody.
2. However, if there is a preponderance of evidence that the act was committed, a denial of benefits
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if
charges have not been filed by the employer within
four weeks. In such a case, the decision under
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a
decision under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) is still * pending
and the 5(b)(1) disqualification shall be changed to a
5(b)(2) disqualification if the claimant is found guilty
by the court. If the claimant has purged a 5(b)(1)
disqualification which was or could be assessed
pending a ruling by the court, benefits must be held
in abeyance until the court reaches the verdict. The
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Department with the court's verdict in order to establish
eligibility.
3. If a determination of eligibility is held in abeyance the claimant must be notified in a written decision that benefits are being withheld in accordance
with Section 35-4-5(b)(2) pending a determination
by the court.
19T7 35-4-5b2,35-4-5M

R475-5c. Failure to Apply for or Accept
Suitable Work
R475-5c-l. General Definition
R475-5c-2. Elements Necessary for an Issue
R475-5c-3. Provisions for Allowance of Benefits After
an Issue is Found to Exist
R475-5c-4. Failure to Accept a Referral
R475-5c-5. Proper Application
R475-5c-6. Failure to Accept an Offer of Work
R475-5c-7. Good Cause
R475-5C-*. Equity and Good Conscience
R475-5c-9. Suitability of Work
R475-5c-10. Examples
R475-5c-ll. New Work
R475-5c-12» Burden of Proof
R475-5c-U. Period of Indifibaity
R475-5c-14. Notification
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Workmen's compensation or the occupationai disease laws."
"Workmens compensation or the occupational disease laws" modifies only "this state"
and not "federal law" in this section. DeLuca v.
Department of Emp. Sec. 746 P.2d 276 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).

Plaintiff may qualify under the statute for
the freezing of the base period where the benefits received were federal social security benefits if the benefits were received as compensation for sickness or illness. DeLuca v. Department of Emp. Sec, 746 P.2d 276 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

35-4-5. Ineligibility for benefits.
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a
waiting period:
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a
nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a
disqualification.
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer, consider for
the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who
has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to
or in a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsection.
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commission, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal
to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona
fide covered employment.
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty constituting a crime in connection with his work as shown by the facts
together with his admission, or as shown by his conviction in a court
of competent jurisdiction of a crime in connection with that dishonesty and for the 51 next following weeks. If by reason of his alleged
dishonesty in connection with his work, the individual is held in legal
custody or is free on bail, any determination of his eligibility shall be
held in abeyance pending his release or conviction.
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant has failed without good
cause to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to
suitable work offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work
offered by an employer or the employment office. The ineligibility continues until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered
employment and earned wages for the services in an amount equal to at
346
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least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall
not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or
accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a nature that
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall consider the purposes of this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary
to equity and good conscience.
(1) In determining whether or not work is suitable for an individual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his
health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his
prior earnings and experience, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, the wages
for similar work in the locality, and the distance of the available
work from his residence.
Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters
used in establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the
most recent employer. The commission shall be more prone to find
work as suitable the longer the claimant has been unemployed and
the less likely the prospects are to secure local work in his customary
occupation.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no work is
suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under
any of the following conditions:
(i) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike,
lockout, or other labor dispute;
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality;
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would
be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain
from joining any bona fide labor organization,
(d) For any week in which the commission finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involving his grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at
which he is or was last employed.
(1) If the commission finds that a strike has been fomented by a
worker of any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or
group of workers of the individual who is found to be a party to the
plan, or agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits.
However, if the commission finds that the strike is caused by the
failure or refusal of any employer to conform to the provisions of any
law of the state of Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours,
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike shall not render the
workers ineligible for benefits.
(2) If the commission finds that the employer, his agent or representative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of his workers,
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their agents or representatives to foment a strike, that strike shall
not render the workers ineligible for benefits.
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to his unemployment because of a strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has obtained
employment and has been paid wages of not less than the amount
specified in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as specified in Subsection 35-4-4(f). During the existence of the stoppage of work due to
this strike the wages of the worker used for the determination of his
benefit rights shall not include any wages he earned from the employer involved in the strike.
(e) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a
false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material
fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions of this act, and an additional 13 weeks for the first week the statement or representation was
made or fact withheld and six weeks for each week thereafter; the additional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. The additional period shall commence on the Sunday following the issuance of a determination finding
the claimant in violation of this subsection. Each individual found in
violation of this subsection shall repay to the commission the amount of
benefits the claimant actually received and, as a civil penalty, an amount
equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud.
The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this
chapter. These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in
the manner provided in Subsections 35-4-17(c) and (e). A claimant is
ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if any amount owed
under this subsection remains unpaid.
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon a sworn
written admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hearing. If a claimant waives the recorded hearing, a determination shall be
made based upon all the facts which the commission, exercising due diligence, has obtained. Determinations by the commission are appealable in
the manner provided by this act for appeals from other benefit determinations.
(f) For any week with respect to which or a part of which he has received or is seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment
compensation law of another state or the United States. If the appropriate
agency of the other state or of the United States finally determines that
he is not entitled to those unemployment benefits, this disqualification
does not apply.
(g) (1) For any week in which he is registered at and attending an
established school, or is on vacation during or between successive
quarters or semesters of school attendance, unless the major portion
of his wages for insured work during his base period was for services
performed while attending school. Notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions of this subsection, an otherwise eligible individual is not
ineligible to receive benefits while attending a part-time training
course. An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits
for any week because he is in training with the approval of the commission, and that individual is not ineligible to receive benefits by
reason of nonavailability for work, failure to search for work, refusal
of suitable work, or failure to apply for or to accept suitable work
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with respect to any week he is in training with the approval of the
commission.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because
he is in training approved under Section 236(a)(1) of the Trade Act of
1974, nor shall he be denied benefits for leaving work to enter that
training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or because of the application to any such week in training of provisions in
this law or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law
relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to
accept work.
For purposes of this subsection, "suitable employment" means work of a
substantially equal or higher skill level than the individual's past
adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act
of 1974, and wages for that work at not less than 80% of the individual's
average weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of
1974.
(h) For any week with respect to which he is receiving, has received, or
is entitled to receive remuneration in the form of:
(1) wages in lieu of notice, or a dismissal or separation payment; or
(2) accrued vacation or terminal leave payment.
If the remuneration is less than the benefits which would otherwise be
due, he is entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits
reduced as provided in Subsection 35-4-3(c).
(i) (1) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on
service for an educational institution in an instructional, research, or
principal administrative capacity and which begins during the period
between two successive academic years, or during a similar period
between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or during a
period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's contract if the individual performs services in the first of those academic
years or terms and if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that
the individual will perform services in any such capacity for an educational institution in the second of the academic years or terms.
(2) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on
service in any other capacity for an educational institution, and
which week begins during a period between two successive academic
years or terms if the individual performs those services in the first of
the academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that
the individual will perform the services in the second of the academic
years or terms. If compensation is denied to any individual under this
subparagraph and the individual was not offered an opportunity to
perform such services for the educational institution for the second of
such academic years or terms, the individual shall be entitled to a
retroactive payment of compensation for each week for which the
individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which compensation was denied solely by reason of this subparagraph.
(3) With respect to any services described in Subsections (i)(l) or
(2), compensation payable on the basis of those services shall be denied to an individual for any week which commences during an established and customary vacation period or holiday recess if the indi349
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vidual performs the services in the period immediately before the
vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance
that the individual will perform the services in the period immediately following the vacation period or holiday recess.
(4) With respect to services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2),
compensation payable on the basis of those services as provided in
Subsection (i)(l), (2), or (3) shall be denied to an individual who
performed those services in an educational institution while in the
employ of an educational service agency. For purposes of this Subsection (i)(4), "educational service agency" means a governmental
agency or entity established and operated exclusively for the purpose
of providing the services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2) to an
educational institution.
Benefits based on service in employment defined in Subsections
35-4-22(j)(2)(D) and (E) are payable in the same amount, on the same
terms and subject to the same conditions as compensation payable on the
basis of other service subject to this chapter.
(j) For any week which commences during the period between two successive sport seasons or similar periods if the individual performed any
services, substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or
athletic events or training or preparing to participate in the first of those
seasons or similar periods and there is a reasonable assurance that individual will perform those services in the later of the seasons or similar
periods.
(k) (1) For any week in which the benefits are based upon services
performed by an alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been
lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time the services
were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing the
services or, was permanently residing in the United States under
color of law at the time the services were performed, including an
alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the
application of Subsection 203(a)(7) or Subsection 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
(2) Any data or information required of individuals applying for
benefits to determine whether benefits are not payable to them because of their alien status shall be uniformly required from all applicants for benefits.
(3) In the case of an individual whose application for benefits
would otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the
individual are not payable because of his alien status shall be made
except upon a preponderance of the evidence.
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 5; C. 1943,
42-2a-5; L. 1949, ch. 53, § 1; 1951, ch. 50, § 1;
1955, ch. 60, § 1; 1959, ch. 57, § 1; 1963, ch.
52, § 1; 1971, ch. 78, § 4; 1971, ch. 79, § 1;
1976, ch. 19, § 2; 1977 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 3;
1979, ch. 137, § 3; 1982, ch. 78, § 4; 1983 (1st
S.S.), ch. 20, § 3; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 18, § 1;
1985, ch. 232, § 2; 1987, ch. 81, § 3; 1987, ch.
92, § 49.
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 (2nd S.S.)
amendment, effective April 6, 1984, substi-

tuted numbers for letters and vice versa as
subsection designations; inserted "Subsection
(9)(a) or (b)" in each sentence of subsection
(9)(b); substituted "Subsections (9)(a) or (b)" for
"clause (1) or (2)" in subsection (9)(c); inserted
subsection (9)(d); and made minor changes in
phraseology, punctuation and style.
The 1985 amendment redesignated the formerly numbered subsections as lettered subsections, and vice versa; deleted bracketed subheadings preceding each of Subsections (a)
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Case No.

88-33-086

:

The employer, Morton Thickcl, appeals the decision of the Administrative Lav; Jucge in tne above-entitled natter ,ihich held that the claimant,
Kevin R. Jonnson, had been discharged frora his employment with tne emoloyer
for reasons that are -not disqualifying
under §35—i—5(b) (1) of tne Utah
Employment Security Act. The ALJus decision therefore allowed payment of
unemployment benefits to the claimant effective December 20, 1937 and
continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. Tne ALJ's decision also
held tne employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to §35-4-7(c) of tne
Act.
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the
Board of Review reverses the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and
denies payment of benefits on the grounds the claimant was dischargee from
his employment for reasons that are disqualifying under §35-4-5(b)(l) of
the Utah Employment Security Act.
In reversing the decision of the ALJ, the Board of Review notes
that, as in its prior decision in I3S-3R-31, involving the same employer,
the employer's rule was reasonable and* its application to the claimant was
fair. After being involved in an accident the claimant was drug tested
in accordance with company policy. The test results were positive. The
company reviewed the situation and concluded that Mr. Johnson was not at
fault in the accident and therefore did not terminate him even though the
drug test results were positive. Rather, the employer referred the claimant
to the employee assistance program for counselling. He was advised he was
subject to random testing during the next 12 month period. On November 25,
1987, 65 days after the initial positive test result, the claimant was
selected for an additional drug testing. He again tested positive for
marijuana use.
The Board of Review finds the claimant's testimony that he did
not use marijuana again after the first test to not be credible. Although,
by his own admission the claimant continued to live in an environment where
marijuana was illegally consumed on a daily basis by his roommates, the
Board of Review does not agree that passive inhalation alone was sufficient
to account for the positive results on the second test*
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Employers have a responsibility to ensure a safe workplace for
their employees ana also to produce produces thaw are, insofar as possible,
frz^ of hiaden defects. This emoloyer's drug policy ana tne manner in
whicn i t was aopliea promote those lauaible oojeccives. This Boara will
not undermine tnose objectives by allowing unemployment benefits to those
who have been discnargec for violating an employer's reasonable policy or
rule respecting tne use of illegal crugs. The emoloyer is tnere~cra
relieved of benefit cnarges as providea by §35---7(c)(3)(F) of tne Utan
Employment Security Act.
r
This decision
creates
an• overpayment
the amount
of $3,513.00.
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This decision will become final ten days after the date of mailing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with tne Court of
Appeals, Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite ^00, Salt Lake City,
Utah, within ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an aopeal
with the Court of Aooeals, you must submit to the Clerk of tne Court a
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for aopeal, pursuant
to §35-^-10(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing
Statement and a Legal Brief.

Dated t h i s 10th day of May, 1983.
BOARD OF REVIEW
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t e Hailed: May 12, 1988.
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Case No. 38-3R-085

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

Subsequent to its decision dated May 10, 1988 and mailed May 12,
1988, the Board of Review received a letter from the claimant's attorney, Oavid
Bert Havas, wherein Mr. Havas requested the Board of Review to reconsider its
decision
on the grounds that he was never notified of the employer's appeal and
was not given an opportunity to submit written argument in favor of the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which decision allowed benefits to
the claimant and was reversed by the 8oard of Review. Mr. Havas requested an
opportunity to submit written argument for the Board's reconsideration.
This request by Mr. Havas was granted by the Board of Review which
has now received Mr.
Havas' memorandum in support of affirmance of the
Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding benefits to the claimant.
After carefully considering the evidence of record in this matter,
the appeal of the employer, and the written arguments of claimant's counsel,
the Board of Review remands this matter to the ALJ to take new evidence as
hereinafter
set
forth,
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
Section
35-4-10(d)(2)(C)(2)(a) of the rules of the Department which provide in
pertinent part:
The Board may also remand a matter for the taking of new
evidence if, in the discretion of the Board, such
evidence is of particularly significant importance that
the Board determines its inclusion in the record is
necessary for proper administration of the Act.
In reviewing the testimony and other evidence of record in this
case, the Board of Review is satisfied that the employer has followed the
requirements of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Statute while testing the
claimant for controlled substances (illegal drugs). The claimant has tested
positive for the presence of controlled substances in his system on both
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September 21st and November 25th of 1987. The claimant has admitted the use of
marijuana prior to the first test on September 21, 1987 but has denied under
oath that he used any marijuana between the test in September and the test in
November. He testified the test results were 1.23 on the September test and
.25 on the November test. He cites the difference in his test results as
supportive of his claim that he did not use marijuana between the two tests.
He attributes the positive result on the November test to either being a
residual of his usage of marijuana prior to the September test or to passive
inhalation as a result of the daily marijuana smoking of his two roommates in
his presence.
Neither the employer nor the claimant presented expert testimony
regarding the drug test results, or the significance of the apparent decrease
from 1.23 to .25 in the test results as indicated by the claimant. Without
expert testimony as to the meaning of the test results, the Board of Review is
unable to determine whether the 65 days between the September test and the
November test was sufficient time for the tested drug to clear the claimant's
body, and if so, the possibilities of the claimant testing positive as a result
of passive inhalation while in the same room with others who are smoking
marijuana.
The Board of Review therefore requests the ALJ to reopen the hearing
and call as an expert witness Ellwood Loveridge, PhD, Director of Scientific
Support Services for the Salt Lake County Health Department. Dr. Loveridge
can be reached at phone number 534-4554. The. notice of the reopened hearing
should be sent to Dr. Loveridge as well as to the claimant and the employer.
Dr. Loveridge should be given the option of testifying in this matter by
telephone. The claimant and the employer shall each be given the opportunity
to cross-examine Dr. Loveridge as to his interpretation of the drug test
results and to offer additional expert testimony in rebuttal if they care to do
so. The employer is also requested to have the lab people who ran the tests in
behalf of the employer available to testify as to their procedures and the test
results of both the September and the November tests of the claimant so that
Dr. Loveridge will be able to provide his interpretation of those test results
for the record. At the close of the reopened hearing, the ALJ is requested to
have the testimony transcribed and forwarded to the Board of Review for a final
decision.
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the
following on this /^5? day of October, 1983 by mailing the
same, postage prepaid, United States mail to:
R.E- Harrington
For: Morton Thiokol
Attn: Debbie St. Clair
P. 0. Box 1160
Columbus, OH 43215
Kevin R. Johnson
3755 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

:

Subsequent to its decision dated May 10, 1988 and mailed May 12,
1983, the 8oard of Review received a letter from the claimant's attorney, Oavid
8ert Havas, wherein Mr. Havas requested the Board of Review to reconsider its
decision on the grounds that he was never notified of the employer's appeal and
was not given an opportunity to submit written argument in favor of the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which decision allowed benefits to
the claimant and was reversed by the Board of Review. Mr. Havas requested an
opportunity to submit written argument for the Board's reconsideration.
This request by Mr. Havas was granted by the Board of Review.
After receiving Mr. Havas' memorandum in support of affirmance of the
Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding benefits to the claimant, the
8oard of Review remanded this case to the ALJ to take additional evidence. In
the remand decision dated September 27, 1988 and mailed October 14, 1988, the
Board of Review requested that the additional testimony be transcribed and
forwarded to the Board of Review for a final decision. The Board of Review has
now received the additional evidence.
After carefully considering the evidence of record in this matter,
the appeal of the employer, and the written arguments of claimant's counsel,
the Board of Review respectfully declines to reverse its decision dated May 10,
1988 and mailed May 12, 1988.
In declining to reverse
its May 10, 1988 decision, the 8oard of
Review makes the following additional comments and findings of fact based
on the October 25, 1988 reopened hearing before the ALJ.
The Board of Review notes that the claimant's attorney objected to
Dr. Loveridge being accepted as an expert witness in this case on the grounds
that Dr. Loveridge was not qualified as an analytical chemist dealing with the
testing of marijuana in the human body and how long marijuana residue remains
in the human body. After carefully considering Dr. Loveridge's answers to Mr.
Havas' questions regarding his experience and expertise with respect to
marijuana testing, the Board of Review sustains Mr. Havas' objections and
therefore disregards Dr. Loveridge's testimony in this matter.
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The employer called Dr. Kerr of its medical services unit as a
witness in this matter.
While Dr. Kerr acknowledged that he is not a
specialist in the field of human toxicology, he testified that he did have
knowledge about the length of time that marijuana residue or cannabinoids
remains in the human body.
Dr. Kerr testified that the claimant's f i r s t test on September 21st
reported positive for 128 nanograms per m i l l i l i t e r for cannabinoids. The
second tesz on November 25th again tasted positive for cannabinoids at 25
nanograms per m i l l i l i t e r .
The required confirmation tests were run on the
samples provided by the claimant on each of those dates. Dr. Kerr testified
the threshold or cutoff point on the preliminary screen test is 20 nanograms
per m i l l i l i t e r and 6 nonograms per milliliter on the confirmation or gas
chromatography t e s t .
Therefore, the 25 nanograms per m i l l i l i t e r measured on
the claimant's November 25th test breached the threshold for a positive test.
Dr. Kerr acknowledged that the 25 nanograms per m i l l i l i t e r result of the
claimant's November 25th test was significantly lower than the 128 nanograms
per m i l l i l i t e r from the claimant's September 21st t e s t . He acknowledged that
he could not predict how long before the 25 nanogram level was found that the
last exposure to marijuana occurred. He acknowledged that there is a prolonged
time in which a test for cannabinoids will remain positive.
He did not
believe, however, that the test would remain positive on November 25th, 1987,
if the claimant had not encountered further exposure to marijuana since
September 21, 1987. Dr. Kerr also acknowledged that there is some evidence to
indicate that extreme exposure to passive inhalation can cause a positive test
result, such as three or four hours in a closed car or a small room with three
to six people heavily smoking marijuana. He knew of no scientific studies that
would indicate whether prolonged exposure such as experienced by the claimant
living with other individuals who frequently used marijuana could result in a
positive t e s t .
Dr. Kerr testified that marijuana can be detected in the body
for several weeks after i t s use, but noted that by several weeks he meant four
to six weeks. He stated he was not personally aware of any studies where
positive tests resulted after a longer period of time.
Dr. Kerr testified that follow-up tests of employees who have
tested positive on a f i r s t test are not administered until at least six weeks
have passed.
He stated the six week period was arrived at on the
recommendation of the Center for Human Toxicology at the University of Utah.
The Center for Human Toxicology felt that anyone who wasn't continuing exposure
to marijuana would test negative after six weeks.
Based on the testimony of Dr. Kerr, the Board of Review finds the
testimony of the claimant wherein he denied continued use of marijuana after
the September 21, 1987 test to not be credible. The Board of Review finds that
if the* claimant had discontinued the use of marijuana after the September 21,
1987 t e s t , he would have tested negative when tested again 65 days later on
November 25, 1987.
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In 1937, the Utah State Legislature passed a drug and alcohol
testing statute with the following declared purpose and intent as found in
Section 34-33-1 of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act:
34-38-1.

Legislative
chapter.

findings

- Purpose

and

intent

of

The Legislature finds that
a healthy and
productive work force, safe working conditions free from the
effects of drugs and alcohol, and maintenance of the quality
of products produced and services rendered in this state,
are important to employers, employees, and the general
public. The Legislature further finds that the abuse of
drugs and alcohol creates a variety of workplace problems,
including increased
injuries
on the job,
increased
absenteeism, increased financial burden
on health and
benefit programs, increased workplace theft,
decreased
employee morale, decreased productivity, and a decline in
the quality of products and services.
Therefore,
in balancing the interests
of
employers, employees, and the welfare of the general public,
the Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing for
drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with this
chapter, is in the best interest of all parties.
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any
employee from seeking damages or job reinstatement, if
action was taken by his employer based on a false drug or
alcohol test result.
The Board of Review finds the employer's alcohol and drug policy to
be consistent with and.in compliance with the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing
Act. On the other hand, by his own admissions in this record, the claimant
appears to have violated Section 58-37-3(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act, which provides:
58-37-3.
(1)

Prohibited acts - Penalties.

Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a)

It is unlawful:

( i i i ) for any person knowingly and intentionally
to be present where controlled substances are being
used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealed from those present; however, a person may
not be convicted under this subsection if the evidence
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snows that he did not use the substance himself or
aovise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any
incidence of prior unlawful use of control lea substances oy tne defendant may be admitted to rebut tnis
defense; • . .
Although the claimant contends he did use marijuana after the
first test on September 21, 1937, the positive results of the second test
on iiovemoer 25, 1937, together with his admission that he continued to live
with two roommates wno consumed marijuana in his presence eK/ery day and
that he was thus exposed to marijuana smoke three or four times a night,
leacs the 3oara of Review to a conclusion that the claimant's denial of
marijuana use following the September test is not credible. The claimant
has admitted using marijuana prior to tne September test. The Board of
Review is not convinced that the claimant discontinued his personal use
of marijuana after tne September test where he continued to live in an
environment where marijuana was used three or four times a nignt on a daily
basis by the claimant's roommates. The Novemoer test results indicate
otherwise. There is nothing in the record of this case to convince the
3oard of Review that passive inhalation, under the circumstances described
by tne claimant, which appears to violate the Utah Controlled Substances
Act, as notea above, is any less culpaole or harmful in its effect than
direct innalation of marijuana smoke.
The Board of Review therefore declines to undermine the 1 audible
objectives of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, the Utah Controlled
Suostances Act, and this employer's drug and alcohol policies by allowing
unemployment insurance benefits to one wno has lost his employment through
a willful violation of his employer's drug and alcohol policy.
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any
further appeal must be made within 3Q days from the date of mailing. Your
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah
Court of Appeals, Midtown
- — cnn cri S t j suite
~ ^ f-'-- r*+" Utah. To file an
appeal ~,w.. -. _
Appeals, you must submit ZQ uie v-»^... ~. ... .
a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant
r
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and Rule
14 of
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a P ^ i r-°-"-.Tfi
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Administrative ?Procedures
^ r ' % ^Act
statement
and
z i n q
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mail to:
David Havas
Attorney at Law
For: Kevin Jonnson
2504 Madison Avenue
Ogden, UT 34^01
Kevin R. Johnson
2535 Porter, Act, £2
Ocaen, UT 3^01
its. Debbie St. Clair
R. £. Harrington
P. 0. Sox 1150
ColumDus, OH 43216
Janes Fox
Employer Relations Representative
Morton Thiokol

P. 0. Box 524
Sriahan City, UT 84302

(l^/tyy^^

/ d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused four true
Brief

of Petitioner to be deposited

and correct copies
in the United States

prepaid, to:
Allan L. Hennebold
Attorney for Respondents
1234 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
On this H ^ d a y of

^Z<V<fr ,^1989.

of the foregoing
Mail,

postage

